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Abstract
Most economic analyses presume that there are limited diﬀerences in the beliefs (“priors”)
of individuals, an assumption most often justiﬁed by the argument that suﬃcient common expe-
riences and observations will eliminate disagreements. We investigate this claim using a simple
model of learning. Two individuals with diﬀerent priors observe the same inﬁnite sequence of
signals about some underlying parameter. Existing results in the literature establish that when
individuals are certain about the interpretation of signals, under very mild conditions their
assessments will eventually agree. In contrast, we look at an environment in which individuals
are uncertain about the interpretation of signals, meaning that they also have non-degenerate
probability distributions over the likelihood of signals given the underlying parameter. As-
suming that the priors (about the parameter and the conditional distribution of the signals)
have full support, we prove the following results. (1) Individuals will never agree, even after
observing the same inﬁnite sequence of signals. (2) Moreover, before observing the signals,
they believe with probability 1 that their posteriors about the underlying parameter will fail
to converge. (3) Observing the same sequence of signals may lead to a divergence of opinion
rather than the typically-presumed convergence. (4) Asymptotic disagreement (and lack of
learning) may prevail even under approximate certainty–i.e., as we look at the limit where
uncertainty about the interpretation of signals disappears. In particular, when the family of
probability distributions of signals given the parameter have “regularly-varying tails” (such as
the Pareto, the log-normal, and the t-distributions), approximate certainty is not suﬃcient to
restore asymptotic learning and asymptotic agreement between agents with diﬀerent priors.
Lack of common beliefs and common priors has important implications for economic behav-
ior in a range of circumstances. We illustrate how the type of learning outlined in this paper
interacts with economic behavior in various diﬀerent situations, including games of common
interest, coordination, asset trading and bargaining.
Keywords: asymptotic disagreement, Bayesian learning, merging of opinions.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C11, C72, D83.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The common prior assumption is one of the cornerstones of modern economic analysis. Most
models postulate that the players in a game have a common prior about the game form and
payoﬀ distributions–for example, they all agree that some payoﬀ-relevant parameter vector θ is
drawn from a known distribution G, even though some of them may have additional information
about some components of θ.Ac o m m o nj u s t i ﬁcation for the common prior assumption comes
from learning; individuals, through their own experiences and the communication of others,
will have access to a history of events informative about the vector θ, and this process will
lead to “agreement” among agents about the distribution of the vector θ.A s t r o n g v e r s i o n
of this view is expressed in Savage (1954, p. 48) as the statement that a Bayesian individual,
who does not assign zero probability to “the truth,” will learn it eventually as long as the
signals are informative about the truth. A more sophisticated version follows from Blackwell
and Dubins’ (1962) theorem about the “merging of opinions”.1
Despite these powerful intuitions and theorems, disagreement is the rule rather than the
exception in practice. Just to mention a few instances, there is typically considerable disagree-
ment even among economists working on a certain topic. For example, economists routinely
disagree about the role of monetary policy, the impact of subsidies on investment or the mag-
nitude of the returns to schooling. Similarly, there are deep divides about religious beliefs
within populations with shared experiences, and ﬁnally, there was recently considerable dis-
agreement among experts with access to the same data about whether Iraq had weapons of
mass destruction. In none of these cases, the disagreements can be traced to individuals having
access to diﬀerent histories of observations. Rather it is their interpretations that diﬀer. In
particular, it seems that an estimate showing that subsidies increase investment is interpreted
very diﬀerently by two economists starting with diﬀerent priors; for example, an economist
believing that subsidies have no eﬀect on investment appears more likely to judge the data or
the methods leading to this estimate to be unreliable and thus to attach less importance to this
evidence. Similarly, those who believed in the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq
presumably interpreted the evidence from inspectors and journalists indicating the opposite as
1Blackwell and Dubins’ (1962) theorem shows that if two probability measures are absolutely continuous with
respect to each other (meaning that they assign positive probability to the same events), then as the number of
observations goes to inﬁnity, their predictions about future frequencies will agree. This is also related to Doob’s
(1948) consistency theorem for Bayesian posteriors, which we discuss and use below.
1biased rather than informative.
In this paper, we show that this type of behavior will be the outcome of learning by
Bayesian individuals with diﬀerent priors, when they are uncertain about the informativeness
of signals. In particular, we consider the following simple environment: one or two individuals
with given priors observe a sequence of signals, {st}
n
t=0, and form their posteriors about some
underlying state variable (parameter) θ. The only non-standard feature of the environment
is that these individuals are uncertain about the distribution of signals conditional on the
underlying state. In the simplest case where the state and the signal are binary, e.g., θ ∈
{A,B},a n dst ∈ {a,b}, this implies that Pr(st = θ | θ)=pθ is not a known number, but
individuals may also have a prior over pθ,s a yg i v e nb yFθ. We refer to this distribution Fθ as
individuals’ subjective probability distribution and to its density fθ as subjective (probability)
density. This distribution, which can diﬀer among individuals, is a natural measure of their
uncertainty about the informativeness of signals. When subjective probability distributions
are non-degenerate, individuals will have some latitude in interpreting the sequence of signals
they observe.
Given this environment our main results are as follows:
1. As long as Fθ has a full support, an individual will not learn the true state θ even as
he (or she) observes inﬁnitely many signals (i.e., as n →∞ ). Instead his posterior on
θ will still be aﬀected by his prior. In contrast, had pθ been a known number (with
pA 6=1− pB), the individual would have learned the true state with probability 1.
2. Again under the full support assumption, when two individuals with diﬀerent priors ob-
serve the same sequence of signals, their posteriors will generally disagree even after
observing inﬁnitely many signals. In fact, we show that individuals attach ex ante prob-
ability 1 that they will disagree after observing the sequence of signals. In contrast, if
each individual i were sure that pθ = pi for some known number pi > 1/2 (even when
p1 6= p2), then their posterior beliefs about the state of the world would eventually agree
and they would believe ex ante with probability 1 that they would agree.2
3. Two individuals may disagree more after observing a common sequence of signals than
they did so previously. We show that for any model over learning under uncertainty that
2As Theorem 2 below shows, the assumption that pθ = p
i is not necessary, and some amount of uncertainty
over pθ (but not full support) is consistent with asymptotic learning and agreement.
2satisﬁes the full support assumption, there exists an open set of pairs of priors such that
the disagreement between the two individuals will necessarily grow starting from these
priors.
4. “Approximate certainty” is not suﬃcient to ensure asymptotic agreement. More speciﬁ-
cally, we show that as we consider a sequence of subjective density functions {fm} that
become more and more concentrated around a single point, whether or not there will be
eventual agreement between two individuals depends on the tail properties of this family
of subjective density functions. In particular, when the family {fm} has regularly-varying
tails (such as the Pareto or thelog-normal distributions), then even under approximate
certainty there will be asymptotic disagreement.
Lack of asymptotic learning has important implications for a range of economic situations.
We illustrate some of these issues by considering a number of simple environments where two
agents observe the same sequence of signals before or while playing a game. In particular, we
discuss the implications of learning in uncertain environments for games of coordination, games
of common interest, bargaining, games of communication and asset trading. Not surprisingly,
given the above description of results, individuals will play these games diﬀerently than in
environments with common priors–and also diﬀe r e n t l yt h a ni ne n v i r o n m e n t sw i t h o u tc o m m o n
priors but where learning takes place under certainty. For example, we establish that contrary
to standard results, individuals may wish to play games of common interests before receiving
more information about payoﬀs. Similarly, we show how the possibility of observing the same
sequence of signals may lead individuals to trade only after they observe the public information.
This result contrasts with both standard no-trade theorems (e.g., Milgrom and Stokey, 1982)
and existing results on asset trading without common priors, which assume learning under
certainty (Harrison and Kreps, 1978, and Morris, 1996). We also provide a simple example
illustrating a potential reason why individuals may be uncertain about informativeness of
signals–the strategic behavior of other agents trying to manipulate their beliefs.
Our results cast doubt about the idea that the common prior assumption may be justiﬁed by
learning. In many environments, even when there is little uncertainty, so that each individual
believes that he will learn the true state, learning need not lead to similar beliefs about the
relevant parameters, and the strategic outcome may be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that of the
3common-prior environment.3 Whether this assumption is warranted will depend on the speciﬁc
setting and what type of information individuals are trying to glean from the data.
Relating our results to the famous Blackwell-Dubins (1962) theorem may help clarify their
essence. As brieﬂy mentioned in Footnote 1, this theorem shows that when two prior distribu-
tions agree on zero-probability events (i.e., they are absolutely continuous with respect to each
other), the opinions that they imply will merge, meaning that, asymptotically, they will make
the same predictions about future frequencies of signals. Our results do not contradict this
t h e o r e m ,s i n c ew ei m p o s ea b s o l u t ec o n t i n u i t yt h r oughout. Instead, our results rely on the fact
that agreeing about future frequencies is not the same as agreeing about the underlying state
(or the underlying payoﬀ relevant parameters).4 Put diﬀerently, under uncertainty, there is
an “identiﬁcation problem” making it impossible for agents to infer the underlying state from
limiting frequencies, and this leads to diﬀerent interpretations of the same signal sequence by
agents with diﬀerent priors. In most economic situations, what is important is not the future
frequencies of signals (which Blackwell-Dubins theorem focuses on), but some payoﬀ-relevant
parameter. For example, what was essential for the debate on the weapons of mass destruction
was not the frequency of news about such weapons but whether or not they existed. What
is relevant for the economists trying to evaluate a policy is not the frequency of estimates on
the eﬀect of similar policies from other researchers, but the impact of this speciﬁcp o l i c yw h e n
(and if) implemented. Similarly, what may be relevant in trading assets is not the frequency
of information about the dividend process, but the actual dividend that the asset will pay.
Thus, many situations in which individuals need to learn about a parameter or state that
will determine their ultimate payoﬀ as a function of their action falls within the realm of the
analysis here.
In this respect, our work diﬀers from papers, such as Freedman (1964) and Miller and
Sanchirico (1999), which question the applicability of the absolute continuity assumption in
the Blackwell-Dubins theorem in statistical and economic settings. Similarly, a number of
important theorems in statistics, for example, Berk (1966), show that under certain conditions,
limiting posteriors will have their support on the set of all identiﬁable values (though they
may fail to converge to a limiting distribution). Our results are diﬀerent from those of Berk
3For the previous arguments about whether game-theoretic models should be formulated with all individuals
having a common prior, see, for example, Aumann (1986, 1998) and Gul (1998).
4In this respect, our paper is also related to Kurz (1994, 1996), which models a situation in which agents
agree about long-run frequencies, but their beliefs fail to merge because of the non-stationarity of the world.
4both because in our model individuals always place positive probability on the truth and also
because we provide a tight characterization of the conditions for lack of asymptotic learning
and agreement.
Finally, our paper is also related to models of media bias, for example, Baron (2004),
Besley and Prat (2006) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006), which investigate the causes or
consequences of manipulation of information by media outlets. We show in Section 4 how
reporting by a biased media outlet can lead to a special case of the learning problem studied
in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides all our main results in the
context of a two-state two-signal setup. Section 3 provides generalizations of these results to
an environment with K states and L ≥ K signals. Section 4 considers a variety of applications
of our results, and Section 5 concludes.
2T h e T w o - S t a t e M o d e l
2.1 Environment
We start with a two-state model with binary signals. This model is suﬃcient to establish all our
main results in the simplest possible setting. These results are later generalized to arbitrary
number of states and signal values.
There are two agents, denoted by i =1and i =2 , who observe a sequence of signals
{st}
n
t=0 where st ∈ {a,b}. The underlying state is θ ∈ {A,B}, and agent i assigns ex ante
probability πi ∈ (0,1) to θ = A. The agents believe that, given θ, the signals are exchangeable,
i.e., they are independently and identically distributed with an unknown distribution.5 That
is, probability of st = a given θ = A is an unknown number pA; likewise, probability of st = b
given θ = B is an unknown number pB–as tabulated in the following table:
AB
a pA 1 − pB
b 1 − pA pB
Our main departure from the standard models is that we allow the agents to be uncertain
5See, for example, Billingsley (1995). If there were only one state, then our model would be identical to De
Finetti’s canonical model (see, for example, Savage, 1954). In the context of this model, De Finetti’s theorem
provides a Bayesian foundation for classical probability theory, by showing that exchnageability (i.e., invariance
under permutations of the order of signals) is equivalent to having an independent identical unknown distrib-
ution and implies that posteriors converge to long-run frequencies. De Finetti’s decomposition of probability
distributions is extended by Jackson, Kalai and Smorodinsky (1999) to cover cases without exchangeability.
5about pA and pB. We denote the cumulative distribution function of pθ according to agent
i–i.e., his subjective probability distribution–by Fi
θ. In the standard models, Fi
θ is degenerate,
putting probability 1 at some ˆ pi
θ. In contrast, we will assume:
Assumption 1 For each i and θ, Fi
θ has a continuous, non-zero and ﬁnite density fi
θ over
[0,1].
The assumption implies that Fi
θ has full support over [0,1]. This assumption ensures
that the absolute continuity assumption of the Blackwell-Dubins theorem is satisﬁed and will
also play an important but diﬀerent role in our analysis. It is worth noting that while this
assumption allows F1
θ (p) and F2
θ (p) to diﬀer, for many of our results it is not important
whether or not this is so (i.e., whether or not the two agents have a common prior about the
distribution of pθ). Throughout, we assume that π1, π2, F1
θ and F2
θ are known to both agents.6
We consider inﬁnite sequences s ≡ {st}
∞
t=1 of signals and write S for the set of all such
sequences. The posterior belief of agent i about θ after observing the ﬁrst n signals {st}
n
t=1 is
φi
n (s) ≡ Pri (θ = A |{ st}
n
t=1),
where Pri (θ = A |{ st}
n
t=1) denotes the posterior probability that θ = A given a sequence of
signals {st}
n
t=1,p r i o rπi and subjective probity distribution Fi
θ (see footnote 7 for a formal
deﬁnition).
Throughout, without loss of any generality, we suppose that in reality θ = A.T h e t w o
questions of interest for us are:
1. Asymptotic learning: whether Pri ¡
limn→∞ φi
n (s)=1 |θ = A
¢
=1for i =1 ,2.
2. Asymptotic agreement: whether Pri ¡
limn→∞
¯ ¯φ1
n (s) − φ2
n (s)
¯ ¯ =0
¢
for i =1 ,2.
Notice that both asymptotic learning and agreement are deﬁn e di nt e r m so ft h ee xa n t e
probability assessments of the two individuals. Therefore, asymptotic learning implies that an
individual believes that he or she will ultimately learn the truth, while asymptotic agreement
implies that both individuals believe that their assessments will eventually converge.
6The assumption that player 1 knows the prior and probability assessment of player 2 regarding the distri-
bution of signals given the state is used in the “asymptotic agreement” results and in applications. Since our
purpose is to understand whether learning justiﬁes the common prior assumption, we depart from Aumann’s
(1976) approach and assume that agents do not change their views because the beliefs of others diﬀer from
theirs.
62.2 Asymptotic Learning and Disagreement
The following theorem gives the well-known result, which applies when Assumption 1 does not
hold. A version of this result is stated in Savage (1954) and also follows from Blackwell and
Dubins’ (1962) more general theorem applied to this case. Since the proof of this theorem
uses diﬀerent arguments than those presented below and is tangential to our focus here, it is
relegated to the Appendix.
Theorem 1 Assume that for some ˆ p1, ˆ p2 ∈ (1/2,1],e a c hFi
θ puts probability 1 on ˆ pi, i.e.,
Fi
θ
¡
ˆ pi¢
=1and Fi
θ (p)=0for each p<ˆ pi. Then, for each i =1 ,2,
1. Pri ¡
limn→∞ φi
n (s)=1 |θ = A
¢
=1 .
2. Pri ¡
limn→∞
¯ ¯φ1
n (s) − φ2
n (s)
¯ ¯ =0
¢
=1 .
Theorem 1 is a slightly generalized version of the standard theorem where the individual
will learn the truth with experience (almost surely as n →∞ ) and two individuals observing
the same sequence will necessarily agree. The generalization arises from the fact that learning
and agreement take place even though ˆ p1 may diﬀer from ˆ p2 (while Savage, 1954, assumes that
ˆ p1 =ˆ p2). Even if the two individuals have diﬀerent expectations about the probability of st = a
conditional on θ = A,t h ef a c tt h a tˆ pi > 1/2 and that they hold these beliefs with certainty is
suﬃcient for asymptotic learning and agreement. Intuitively, this is because both individuals
will, with certainty, interpret one of the signals as evidence that the state is θ = A,a n da l s o
believe that when the state is θ = A, the majority of the signals in the limiting distribution
will be st = a. Based on this idea, we generalize Theorem 1 to the case where the agents are
not necessarily certain about the signal distribution but their subjective distributions do not
satisfy the full support feature of Assumption 1.
Theorem 2 Assume that each Fi
θ has a density fi
θ and Fi
θ (1/2) = 0. Then, for each i =1 ,2,
1. Pri ¡
limn→∞ φi
n (s)=1 |θ = A
¢
=1 .
2. Pri ¡
limn→∞
¯ ¯φ1
n (s) − φ2
n (s)
¯ ¯ =0
¢
=1 .
This theorem will be proved together with the next one, Theorem 3, below. It is evident that
the assumption Fi
θ (1/2) = 0 implies that pθ > 1/2, contradicting the full support assumption
imposed in Assumption 1.
7In contrast to the previous two theorems which establish asymptotic learning and agreement
results, our next result is a negative one and shows that when Fi
θ has full support as speciﬁed
in Assumption 1, there will be neither asymptotic learning nor asymptotic agreement.
Theorem 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds for i =1 ,2,t h e n
1. Pri ¡
limn→∞ φi
n (s) 6=1 |θ = A
¢
=1for i =1 ,2.
2. Pri ¡
limn→∞
¯
¯φ1
n (s) − φ2
n (s)
¯
¯ 6=0
¢
=1whenever π1 6= π2 and F1
θ = F2
θ for each θ ∈
{A,B}.
This theorem therefore contrasts with Theorems 1 and 2 and implies that instead of learning
the true state, the individual in question will fail to learn the true state with probability 1.
The second part of the theorem states that if the agents’ prior beliefs about the state diﬀers
(but they interpret the signals in the same way), then their posteriors will eventually disagree,
and moreover, they will both attach probability 1 to the event that their beliefs will eventually
diverge. Put diﬀerently, this implies that there is “agreement to eventually disagree” between
the two players, in the sense that they both believe ex ante that after observing the signals,
they will fail to agree. This feature will play an important role in the applications in Section
4b e l o w .
Towards proving the above theorems, we now introduce some notation, which will be used
throughout the paper. Recall that the sequence of signals, s, is exchangeable, so that the order
of the signals does not matter for the posterior. Let
rn (s) ≡ #{t ≤ n|st = a}
be the number of times st = a out of ﬁrst n signals.7 B yt h es t r o n gl a wo fl a r g en u m b e r s ,
rn (s)/n converges to some ρ ∈ [0,1] almost surely according to both agents. Deﬁning the set
¯ S ≡ {s ∈ S :l i m n→∞ rn (s)/n exists}, (1)
7Given the deﬁnition of rn (s), the probability distribution Pr
i (on {A,B}×S with respect to the product
topology) can be formally deﬁned as
Pr
i
³
E
A,s,n
´
≡ π
i
Z 1
0
p
rn(s) (1 − p)
n−rn(s) f
i
A (p)dp, and
Pr
i
³
E
B,s,n
´
≡
³
1 − π
i
´Z 1
0
(1 − p)
rn(s) p
n−rn(s)f
i
B (p)dp
at each event E
θ,s,n = {(θ,s
0)|s
0
t = st for each t ≤ n},w h e r es ≡ {st}
∞
t=1 and s
0 ≡ {s
0
t}
∞
t=1.
8this observation implies that Pri ¡
s ∈ ¯ S
¢
=1for i =1 ,2. We will often state our results for all
sample paths s in ¯ S, which equivalently implies that these statements are true almost surely
or with probability 1. Now, a straightforward application of the Bayes rule gives
φi
n (s)=
1
1+1−πi
πi
Pri(rn|θ=B)
Pri(rn|θ=A)
, (2)
where Pri (rn|θ) is the probability of observing the signal st = a exactly rn times out of n
signals with respect to the distribution Fi
θ. The next lemma provides a very useful formula for
φi
∞ (s) ≡ limn→∞ φi
n (s) for all sample paths s in ¯ S.
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then for all s ∈ ¯ S,
φi
∞ (ρ(s)) ≡ lim
n→∞φi
n (s)=
1
1+1−πi
πi Ri (ρ(s))
, (3)
where ρ(s)=l i m n→∞ rn (s)/n,a n d∀ρ ∈ [0,1],
Ri (ρ)=
fi
B (1 − ρ)
fi
A (ρ)
. (4)
Proof. Write
Pri (rn|θ = B)
Pri (rn|θ = A)
=
R 1
0 prn(1 − p)n−rnfB(1 − p)dp
R 1
0 prn(1 − p)n−rnfA(p)dp
=
R 1
0 prn(1−p)n−rnfB(1−p)dp
R 1
0 prn(1−p)n−rndp
R 1
0 prn(1−p)n−rnfA(p)dp
R 1
0 prn(1−p)n−rndp
=
Eλ[fB(1 − p)|rn]
Eλ[fA(p)|rn]
where Eλ[f(p)|rn] denotes the expectation of f given rn under the ﬂat (Lebesgue) prior. By
Doob’s consistency theorem for Bayesian posterior expectation of the parameter as rn → ρ,
we have that Eλ[fB(1 − p)|rn] → fB(1 − ρ) and Eλ[fA(p)|rn] → fA(ρ) (see, e.g., Doob, 1949,
Ghosh and Ramamoorthi, 2003, Theorem 1.3.2). This establishes
Pri (rn|θ = B)
Pri (rn|θ = A)
→ Ri (ρ),
as deﬁned in (4). Then, (2) yields (3).
In equation (4), Ri (ρ) is the asymptotic likelihood ratio of observing frequency ρ of a when
t h et r u es t a t ei sB versus when it is A. Lemma 1 states that, asymptotically, the agent i uses
this likelihood ratio and the Bayes rule to compute his posterior beliefs about θ.
9An immediate implication of Lemma 1 is that given any s ∈ ¯ S,
φ1
∞ (ρ(s)) = φ2
∞ (ρ(s)) i fa n do n l yi f
1 − π1
π1 R1 (ρ(s)) =
1 − π2
π2 R2 (ρ(s)) .( 5 )
The proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 now follow from Lemma 1 and equation (5).
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 .Under the assumption that Fi
θ (1/2) = 0 in the theorem, the argu-
ment in Lemma 1 still applies, and we have Ri (ρ(s)) = 0 when ρ(s) > 1/2 and Ri (ρ(s)) = ∞
when ρ(s) < 1/2.G i v e nθ = A,t h e nrn (s)/n converges to some ρ(s) > 1/2 almost surely ac-
cording to both i =1and 2. Hence, Pri ¡
φ1
∞ (ρ(s)) = 1|θ = A
¢
=P r i ¡
φ2
∞ (ρ(s)) = 1|θ = A
¢
=
1 for i =1 ,2. Similarly,
Pri ¡
φ1
∞ (ρ(s)) = 0|θ = B
¢
=P r i ¡
φ2
∞ (ρ(s)) = 0|θ = B
¢
=1for i =1 ,2, establishing the sec-
ond part. ¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 . Since fi
B (1 − ρ(s)) > 0 and fA (ρ(s)) is ﬁnite, Ri (ρ(s)) > 0.
Hence, by Lemma 1, φi
∞ (ρ(s)) 6=1for each s, establishing the ﬁrst part. The second part
immediately follows from equation (5), since π1 6= π2 and F1
θ = F2
θ implies that for each s ∈ ¯ S,
limn→∞ φ1
n (s) 6=l i m n→∞ φ2
n (s), and thus Pri ¡
limn→∞
¯
¯φ1
n (s) − φ2
n (s)
¯
¯ 6=0
¢
=1for i =1 ,2.
¥
Intuitively, when Assumption 1 (in particular, the full support feature) holds, an individual
is never sure about the exact interpretation of the sequence of signals he observes and will
update his views about pθ (the informativeness of the signals) as well as his views about the
underlying state. For example, even when signal a is more likely in state A than in state
B, a very high frequency of a will not necessarily convince him that the true state is A,
because he may infer that the signals are not as reliable as he initially believed, and they may
instead be biased towards a. Therefore, the individual never becomes certain about the state,
which is captured by the fact that Ri (ρ) deﬁned in (4) never takes the value zero or inﬁnity.
Consequently, as shown in (3), his posterior beliefs will be determined by his prior beliefs
about the state and also by Ri, which tells us how the agent updates his beliefs about the
i n f o r m a t i v e n e s so ft h es i g n a l sa sh eo b s e r v e st he signals. When two individuals interpret the
informativeness of the signals in the same way (i.e., R1 = R2), the diﬀerences in their priors
will always be reﬂected in their posteriors.
10In contrast, if an agent were sure about the informativeness of the signals (i.e., if i were
sure that pA = pB = pi for some pi > 1/2) as in Theorem 1, then he would never question
the informativeness of the signals–even when the limiting frequency of a converges to a value
diﬀerent from pi or 1 − pi. Consequently, in this case, for each sample path with ρ(s) 6=1 /2
both agents would learn the true state and their posterior beliefs would agree asymptotically.
As noted above, an important implication of Theorem 3 is that there will typically be
“agreement to eventually disagree” between the individuals. In other words, given their priors,
both individuals will agree that after seeing the same inﬁnite sequence of signals they will still
disagree (with probability 1). This implication is interesting in part because the common prior
assumption, typically justiﬁed by learning, leads to the celebrated “no agreement to disagree”
result (Aumann, 1976, 1998), which states that if the agents’ posterior beliefs are common
knowledge, then they must be equal.8 In contrast, in the limit of the learning process here,
the agents’ beliefs are common knowledge (as there is no private information), but they are
diﬀerent with probability 1. This is because in the presence of uncertainty, as deﬁned by
Assumption 1, both individuals understand that their priors will have an eﬀect on their beliefs
even asymptotically, thus expect to disagree. Many of the applications we discuss in Section 4
will exploit this feature.
We have established that the diﬀerences in priors are reﬂected in the posteriors even in the
limit n →∞when the agents interpret the informativeness of the signals similarly. This raises
the question of whether two individuals that observe the same sequence of signals may have
diverging posteriors, i.e., whether common information can turn agreement into disagreement.
T h en e x tt h e o r e ms h o w st h i sc a nb et h ec a s ea sl o n g as individuals start with relatively similar
priors.
Theorem 4 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that there exists  >0 such that
¯ ¯R1 (ρ) − R2 (ρ)
¯ ¯ >
  for each ρ ∈ [0,1]. Then, there exists an open set of priors π1 and π2, such that for all s ∈ ¯ S,
lim
n→∞
¯ ¯φ1
n (s) − φ2
n (s)
¯ ¯ >
¯ ¯π1 − π2¯ ¯;
in particular,
Pri
³
lim
n→∞
¯ ¯φ1
n (s) − φ2
n (s)
¯ ¯ >
¯ ¯π1 − π2¯ ¯
´
=1 .
8Note, however, that “no agreement to disagree” result is derived from individuals updating their beliefs
because those of others diﬀer from theirs, whereas here individuals only update their beliefs by learning.
11Proof. Fix π1 = π2 =1 /2. By Lemma 1 and the hypothesis that
¯
¯R1 (ρ) − R2 (ρ)
¯
¯ > 
for each ρ ∈ [0,1], limn→∞
¯ ¯φ1
n (s) − φ2
n (s)
¯ ¯ >  0 for some  0 > 0,w h i l e
¯ ¯π1 − π2¯ ¯ =0 .S i n c e
both expressions are continuous in π1 and π2, there is an open neighborhood of 1/2 such that
the above inequality uniformly holds for each ρ whenever π1 and π2 are in this neighborhood.
The last statement follows from the fact that Pri ¡
s ∈ ¯ S
¢
=1 .
Intuitively, even a small diﬀerence in priors ensures that individuals will interpret signals
diﬀerently, and if the original disagreement was relatively small, after almost all sequences of
signals, the disagreement between the two individuals will grow. Consequently, the observation
of a common sequence of signals causes an initial diﬀerence of opinion between agents to widen
(instead of the standard merging of opinions under certainty). Theorem 4 also shows that
both individuals are certain ex ante that their posteriors will diverge after observing the same
sequence of signals, because they understand that they will interpret the signals diﬀerently.
This strengthens our results further and shows that for some priors individuals will “agree to
eventually disagree even more”.
An interesting implication of Theorem 4 is also worth noting. As demonstrated by The-
orems 1 and 2, when there is learning under certainty individuals initially disagree, but each
individual also believes that they will eventually agree (and in fact, that they will converge to
his or her beliefs). This implies that each individual expects the other to “learn more”. More
speciﬁcally, let Iθ=A be the indicator function for θ = A and Λi =
¡
πi − Iθ=A
¢2−
¡
φi
∞ − Iθ=A
¢2
be a measure of learning for individual i,w i t hEi deﬁned as the expectation of individual i
(under the probability measure Pri). Under certainty, Theorem 1 implies that φi
∞ = φj
∞ =
Iθ=A,s ot h a tEi £
Λi − Λj¤
= −
¡
πi − πj¢2 < 0 and thus Ei £
Λi¤
<E i £
Λj¤
. Under uncertainty,
this is not necessarily true. In particular, Theorem 4 implies that, under the assumptions
of the theorem, there exists an open subset of the interval [0,1] such that whenever π1 and
π2 are in this subset, we have Ei £
Λi¤
>E i £
Λj¤
, so that individual i would expect to learn
more than the other individual. The reason is that individual i is not only conﬁdent about his
initial guess πi, but also expects to learn more from the sequence of signals than individual j,
because he believes that individual j has the “wrong model of the world”. The fact that an
individual may expect to learn more than another agent will play an important role in some
of the applications in Section 4.
122.3 Nonmonotonicity of the Likelihood Ratio
We next illustrate that the asymptotic likelihood ratio, Ri (ρ), may be non-monotone, meaning
that when an agent observes a high frequency of signals taking the value a, he may conclude
that the signals are biased towards a, and he may end up putting lower probability on state A
than he would have done with a lower frequency of a among the signals. This feature not only
illustrates the types of behavior that are possible when agents are learning under uncertainty,
but is also important for the applications we discuss in Section 4.
Inspection of expression (3) establishes the following:
Lemma 2 For any s ∈ ¯ S, φi
∞ (s) is decreasing at ρ(s) if and only if Ri is increasing at ρ(s).
Proof. This follows immediately from equation (3) above.
When Ri is non-monotone, even a small amount of uncertainty about the informativeness
may lead to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in limit posteriors. The next example illustrates this point,
while the second example shows that there can be “reversals” in individuals’ assessments,
meaning that after observing a sequence “favorable” to state A, the individual may have a
lower posterior about this state than his prior. The impact of small uncertainty on asymptotic
learning and agreement will be more systematically studied in the next subsection.
Example 1 (Nonmonotonicity) Each agent i thinks that with probability 1 −  , pA and
pB are in a δ-neighborhood of some ˆ pi > (1 + δ)/2, but with probability  >0, the signals are
not informative. More precisely, for ˆ pi > (1 + δ)/2,  >0 and δ<
¯
¯ˆ p1 − ˆ p2¯
¯,w eh a v e
fi
θ (p)=
½
  +( 1−  )/δ if p ∈
¡
ˆ pi − δ/2, ˆ pi + δ/2
¢
  otherwise
(6)
for each θ and i. Now, by (4), the asymptotic likelihood ratio is
Ri (ρ(s)) =
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
 δ
1− (1−δ) if ρ(s) ∈
¡
ˆ pi − δ/2, ˆ pi + δ/2
¢
1− (1−δ)
 δ if ρ(s) ∈
¡
1 − ˆ pi − δ/2,1 − ˆ pi + δ/2
¢
1 otherwise.
This and other relevant functions are plotted in Figure 1 for   → 0. The likelihood ratio
Ri (ρ(s)) is 1 when ρ(s) is small, takes a very high value at 1− ˆ pi,g o e sd o w nt o1 afterwards,
becomes nearly zero around ˆ pi, and then jumps back to 1.B yL e m m a s1a n d2 ,φi
∞ (s) will also
be non-monotone: when ρ(s) is small, the signals are not informative, thus φi
∞ (s) is the same
as the prior, πi. In contrast, around 1−ˆ pi, the signals become very informative suggesting that
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Figure 1: Approximate values of the likelihood ratio, φi
∞,a n d
¯
¯φ1
∞ − φ2
∞
¯
¯ when   is negligible.
the state is B,t h u sφi
∞ (s) ∼ = 0. After this point, the signals become uninformative again and
φi
∞ (s) goes back to πi. Around ˆ pi, the signals are again informative, but this time favoring
state A,s oφi
∞ (s) ∼ = 1,a n dﬁnally signals again become uninformative and φi
∞ (s) falls back
to πi.
Intuitively, when ρ(s) is around 1− ˆ pi or ˆ pi, the agent assigns very high probability to the
true state, but outside of this region, he sticks to his prior, concluding that the signals are
not informative. However, he also understands that since δ<
¯ ¯ˆ p1 − ˆ p2¯ ¯, when the long-run
frequency in a region where he learns that θ = A, the other agent will conclude that the signals
are uninformative and adhere to his prior belief; conversely, when the other agent learns, he
will view the signals as uninformative. Consequently, he knows that the posterior beliefs of the
other agents will always be far from his. This can be seen from the third panel of Figure 1; at
each sample path in ¯ S, at least one of the agents will fail to learn, and the diﬀerence between
their limiting posteriors will be uniformly higher than the following lower bound
min
©
π1,π2,1 − π1,1 − π2,
¯ ¯π1 − π2¯ ¯ª
.
When π1 =1 /3 and π2 =2 /3, this bound is equal to 1/3.9
T h en e x te x a m p l es h o w sa ne v e nm o r ee x t r e m ephenomenon, whereby a high frequency of
s = a among the signals may reduce the individual’s posterior that θ = A below his prior.
9In fact, since each agent believes that he will learn but the other agent will not, their expected diﬀerence
in limit posteriors will be even higher: for each i, Pr
i ¡
limn→∞
¯ ¯φ
1
n (s) − φ
2
n (s)
¯ ¯ ≥ Z
¢
≥ 1 −  ,w h e r eZ →
min
©
π
1,π
2,1 − π
1,1 − π
2ª
. This bound can be as high as 1/2.
14Example 2 (Reversal) Now suppose that individuals’ subjective probability densities are
given by
fi
θ (p)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
¡
1 −   −  2¢
/δ if ˆ pi − δ/2 ≤ p ≤ ˆ pi + δ/2
  if p<1/2
 2 otherwise
for each θ and i =1 ,2,w h e r e >0, ˆ pi > 1/2, and 0 <δ<ˆ p1 − ˆ p2.C l e a r l y , a s   → 0,( 4 )
gives:
Ri (ρ(s)) ∼ =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
if ρ(s) < 1 − ˆ pi − δ/2,
0 or 1 − ˆ pi + δ/2 <ρ(s) < 1/2,
or ˆ pi − δ/2 ≤ ρ(s) ≤ ˆ pi + δ/2
∞ otherwise.
Hence, the asymptotic posterior probability that θ = A is
φi
∞ (ρ(s)) ∼ =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
if ρ(s) < 1 − ˆ pi − δ/2,
1 or 1 − ˆ pi + δ/2 <ρ(s) < 1/2,
or ˆ pi − δ/2 ≤ ρ(s) ≤ ˆ pi + δ/2
0 otherwise.
Consequently, in this case observing a suﬃciently high frequency of s = a may reduce the
posterior that θ = A below the prior. Moreover, the agents assign probability 1−  that there
will be extreme asymptotic disagreement in the sense that
¯ ¯φ1
∞ (ρ(s)) − φ2
∞ (ρ(s))
¯ ¯ ∼ = 1.
In both examples, it is crucial that the likelihood ratio Ri is not monotone. If Ri were
monotone, at least one of the agents would expect that their beliefs will asymptotically agree.
To see this, take ˆ pi ≥ ˆ pj.N o w , i is almost certain that, when the state is A, ρ(s) will be
close to ˆ pi. He also understands that j would assign a very high probability to the event that
θ = A when ρ(s)=ˆ pj ≥ ˆ pi.I fRj were monotone, she would assign even higher probability to
A at ρ(s)=ˆ pi and thus her probability assessment on A w o u l da l s oc o n v e r g et o1a s  → 0.
Therefore, in this case i will be almost certain that j will learn the true state and that their
beliefs will agree asymptotically.
2.4 Agreement and Disagreement with Approximate Certainty
The analysis so far shows that for general distributions of priors Fi
θ that satisfy Assumption 1,
two individuals will interpret common signals diﬀerently and will disagree even after observing
an inﬁnite number of signals. The reason for these results is the “uncertainty” about the
informativeness of the signals captured by the full support aspect of Assumption 1. One might
15think that as the extent of this uncertainty declines, i.e., as each Fi
θ converges to a Dirac
distribution (that assigns a unit mass to a point), there will be agreement between the two
agents as in Theorem 1. The two examples in the previous subsection already hint that this
may not be true. In both examples, as   → 0 and δ → 0, Fi
θ’s converge to Dirac distributions,
but a strong asymptotic disagreement result continues to apply.
In this subsection, we investigate the implications of “approximate certainty” more system-
atically by studying the behavior of asymptotic beliefs as the subjective probability distribution
Fi
θ converges to a Dirac distribution and the uncertainty about the interpretation of the sig-
nals disappears. We will show that whether there is asymptotic agreement or disagreement
depends on the family of distributions converging to certainty–in particular, on their tail
properties. We will see that for many natural distributions, a small amount of uncertainty
about informativeness of the signals is suﬃcient to lead to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in posteriors.
To state and prove our main result in this case, consider a family of subjective probability
density functions fi
θ,m(p) for i =1 ,2, θ ∈ {A,B} and m ∈ Z+, such that as m →∞ ,w e
have that Fi
θ,m → Fi
θ,∞ where Fi
θ,∞ assigns probability 1 to p =ˆ pi for some ˆ pi ∈ (1/2,1).I n
particular, we consider the following families: take a determining density function f,w h i c h
will parameterize
n
fi
θ,m(p)
o
. We impose the following conditions on f:
condition (i): f (x) is symmetric around zero;
condition (ii): f (x) is monotonically decreasing for all x ≥ ¯ x for some ¯ x<∞;
condition (iii):
˜ R(x,y) ≡ lim
m→∞
f (mx)
f (my)
(7)
exists in [0,∞] at all (x,y) ∈ R2
+.10
In order to vary the amount of uncertainty, we consider mappings of the form x 7→
(x − y)/m, which scale down the real line around y by the factor 1/m.T h ef a m i l yo fs u b j e c -
tive densities for agents’ beliefs about pA and pB,
n
fi
θ,m
o
, will be determined by f and the
transformation x 7→
¡
x − ˆ pi¢
/m. In particular, we consider the following family of densities
fi
θ,m(p)=ci (m)f
¡
m
¡
p − ˆ pi¢¢
(8)
for each θ and i where ci (m) ≡ 1/
R 1
0 f
¡
m
¡
p − ˆ pi¢¢
dp is a correction factor to ensure that
fi
θ,m is a proper probability density function on [0,1] for each m.W e a l s o d e ﬁne φi
∞,m ≡
10Convergence will be uniform in most cases in view of the results discussed following Deﬁnition 1 below (and
Egorov’s theorem).
16limn→∞ φi
n,m (s) as the limiting posterior distribution of individual i when he believes that the
probability density of signals is fi
θ,m. In this family of subjective densities, the uncertainty
about pA is scaled down by 1/m,a n dfi
θ,m converges to unit mass at ˆ pi as m →∞ ,s ot h a t
agent i becomes sure about the informativeness of the signals in the limit. In other words, as
m →∞ , this family of subjective probability distributions leads to approximate certainty.
The next theorem characterizes the class of determining functions f for which the resulting
family of the subjective densities
n
fi
θ,m
o
leads to asymptotic learning and agreement under
approximate certainty.
Theorem 5 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. For each i =1 ,2, consider the family of
subjective densities
n
fi
θ,m
o
deﬁned in (8) for some ˆ pi > 1/2,w i t hf satisfying conditions (i)-
(iii) above. Suppose that f (mx)/f (my) uniformly converges to ˜ R(x,y) over a neighborhood
of
¡
ˆ p1 +ˆ p2 − 1,
¯ ¯ˆ p1 − ˆ p2¯ ¯¢
.T h e n ,
1. limm→∞
¡
φi
∞,m
¡
ˆ pi¢
− φj
∞,m
¡
ˆ pi¢¢
=0if and only if ˜ R
¡
ˆ p1 +ˆ p2 − 1,
¯ ¯ˆ p1 − ˆ p2¯ ¯¢
=0 .
2. If ˜ R
¡
ˆ p1 +ˆ p2 − 1,
¯ ¯ˆ p1 − ˆ p2¯ ¯¢
=0 , then for every λ>0 and δ>0,t h e r ee x i s t s¯ m ∈ Z+
such that for i =1 ,2 and all m>¯ m, we have:
Pri
³
lim
n→∞
¯ ¯φ1
n,m (s) − φ2
n,m (s)
¯ ¯ >λ
´
<δ .
3. If ˜ R
¡
ˆ p1 +ˆ p2 − 1,
¯ ¯ˆ p1 − ˆ p2¯ ¯¢
6=0 , then there exists λ>0 such that for each δ>0,t h e r e
exists ¯ m ∈ Z+ such that for i =1 ,2 and all m ∈ Z+ with m>¯ m, we have:
Pri
³
lim
n→∞
¯ ¯φ1
n,m (s) − φ2
n,m (s)
¯ ¯ >λ
´
> 1 − δ.
Proof. (Proof of Part 1) Let Ri
m (π) be the asymptotic likelihood ratio as deﬁned in
(4) associated with subjective density fi
θ,m.O n ec a ne a s i l yc h e c kt h a tlimm→∞ Ri
m
¡
ˆ pi¢
=0 ,
and hence limm→∞ φi
∞,m
¡
ˆ pi¢
=1 .T h u s ,limm→∞
¡
φi
∞,m
¡
ˆ pi¢
− φj
∞,m
¡
ˆ pi¢¢
=0i fa n do n l yi f
limm→∞ φj
∞,m
¡
ˆ pi¢
=1 , which holds if and only if limm→∞ R
j
m
¡
ˆ pi¢
=0 .B y d e ﬁnition, we
have:
lim
m→∞Rj
m
¡
ˆ pi¢
=l i m
m→∞
f
¡
m
¡
1 − ˆ p1 − ˆ p2¢¢
f (m(ˆ p1 − ˆ p2))
= ˜ R
¡
1 − ˆ p1 − ˆ p2, ˆ p1 − ˆ p2¢
= ˜ R
¡
ˆ p1 +ˆ p2 − 1,
¯ ¯ˆ p1 − ˆ p2¯ ¯¢
,
where the last equality follows by condition (i), the symmetry of the function f.T h i se s t a b l i s h e s
that limm→∞ Ri
m
¡
ˆ pi¢
=0(and thus limm→∞
¡
φi
∞,m
¡
ˆ pi¢
− φj
∞,m
¡
ˆ pi¢¢
=0 )i fa n do n l yi f
˜ R
¡
ˆ p1 +ˆ p2 − 1,
¯ ¯ˆ p1 − ˆ p2¯ ¯¢
=0 .
17(Proof of Part 2) Take any λ>0 and δ>0, and assume that ˜ R
¡
ˆ p1 +ˆ p2 − 1,
¯
¯ˆ p1 − ˆ p2¯
¯¢
=0 .
By Lemma 1, there exists λ0 > 0 such that φi
∞,m (ρ(s)) > 1−λ whenever Ri (ρ(s)) <λ 0.T h e r e
also exists x0 such that
Pri ¡
ρ(s) ∈
¡
ˆ pi − x0/m, ˆ pi + x0/m
¢
|θ = A
¢
=
Z x0
−x0
f (x)dx > 1 − δ. (9)
Let κ =m i n x∈[−x0,x0] f (x) > 0.S i n c ef monotonically decreases to zero in the tails (see (ii)
above), there exists x1 such that f (x) <λ 0κ whenever |x| > |x1|.L e tm1 =( x0 + x1)/
¡
2ˆ pi − 1
¢
>
0. Then, for any m>m 1 and ρ(s) ∈
¡
ˆ pi − x0/m, ˆ pi + x0/m
¢
,w eh a v e
¯ ¯ρ(s) − 1+ˆ pi¯ ¯ >x 1/m,
and hence
Ri
m (ρ(s)) =
f
¡
m
¡
ρ(s)+ˆ pi − 1
¢¢
f (m(ρ(s) − ˆ pi))
<
λ0κ
κ
= λ0.
Therefore, for all m>m 1 and ρ(s) ∈
¡
ˆ pi − x0/m, ˆ pi + x0/m
¢
,w eh a v et h a t
φi
∞,m (ρ(s)) > 1 − λ. (10)
Again, by Lemma 1, there exists λ00 > 0 such that φj
∞,m (ρ(s)) > 1−λ whenever R
j
m (ρ(s)) <
λ00.N o w ,f o re a c hρ(s),
lim
m→∞Rj
m (ρ(s)) = ˜ R
¡
ρ(s)+ˆ pj − 1,
¯ ¯ρ(s) − ˆ pj¯ ¯¢
. (11)
Moreover, by the uniform convergence assumption, there exists δ>0 such that R
j
m (ρ(s))
uniformly converges to ˜ R
¡
ρ(s)+ˆ pj − 1,
¯
¯ρ(s) − ˆ pj¯
¯¢
on
¡
ˆ pi − δ, ˆ pi + δ
¢
and
˜ R
¡
ρ(s)+ˆ pj − 1,
¯ ¯ρ(s) − ˆ pj¯ ¯¢
<λ 00/2
for each ρ(s) in
¡
ˆ pi − δ, ˆ pi + δ
¢
. (By unifom convergence, at
¡
ˆ p1 +ˆ p2 − 1,
¯ ¯ˆ p1 − ˆ p2¯ ¯¢
, ˜ R is
continuous and takes value of 0–by assumption.) Hence, there exists m2 < ∞ such that for
all m>m 2 and ρ(s) ∈
¡
ˆ pi − δ, ˆ pi + δ
¢
,
Rj
m (ρ(s)) < ˜ R
¡
ρ(s)+ˆ pj − 1,
¯
¯ρ(s) − ˆ pj¯
¯¢
+ λ00/2 <λ 00.
Therefore, for all m>m 2 and ρ(s) ∈
¡
ˆ pi − δ, ˆ pi + δ
¢
,w eh a v e
φj
∞,m (ρ(s)) > 1 − λ. (12)
Set ¯ m ≡ max{m1,m 2,δ/x 0}. Then, by (10) and (12), for any m>¯ m and ρ(s) ∈
¡
ˆ pi − x0/m, ˆ pi + x0/m
¢
,w eh a v e
¯ ¯φi
∞,m (ρ(s)) − φj
∞,m (ρ(s))
¯ ¯ <λ . Then, (9) implies that
18Pri ¡¯
¯φi
∞,m (ρ(s)) − φj
∞,m (ρ(s))
¯
¯ <λ |θ = A
¢
> 1 − δ.B y t h e s y m m e t r y o f A and B,t h i s
establishes that Pri ¡
|φi
∞,m (ρ(s)) − φj
∞,m (ρ(s))| <λ
¢
> 1 − δ for m>¯ m.
(Proof of Part 3) Since limm→∞ R
j
m
¡
ˆ pi¢
= ˜ R
¡
ˆ p1 +ˆ p2 − 1,
¯ ¯ˆ p1 − ˆ p2¯ ¯¢
is assumed to be
strictly positive, limm→∞ φj
∞,m
¡
ˆ pi¢
< 1.W e s e t λ =
¡
1 − limm→∞ φj
∞,m
¡
ˆ pi¢¢
/2 and use
similar arguments to those in the proof of Part 2 to obtain the desired conclusion.
Theorem 5 therefore shows that approximate certainty may not be enough to guarantee
asymptotic learning and agreement. This contrasts with the result in Theorems 1 that there
will always be asymptotic learning and agreement under full certainty. Under the conditions
in Theorem 5, even a small amount of uncertainty is suﬃcient to cause absence of learning and
disagreement between the agents.
The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h et h e o r e ma l s op r o v i d e sas i m p le condition on the tail of the distribution
f that determines whether the asymptotic diﬀerence between the posteriors is small under
approximate uncertainty. This condition can be expressed as:
˜ R
¡
ˆ p1 +ˆ p2 − 1,
¯ ¯ˆ p1 − ˆ p2¯ ¯¢
≡ lim
m→∞
f
¡
m
¡
ˆ p1 +ˆ p2 − 1
¢¢
f (m(ˆ p1 − ˆ p2))
=0 . (13)
The ﬁrst part of the theorem establishes that if this condition is satisﬁed, then as uncertainty
about the informativeness of the signals disappears, the diﬀerence between the posteriors of
the two agents will become negligible. Notice that condition (13) is symmetric and does not
depend on i.
Based on this result and continuity of ˜ R, parts 2 and 3 of the theorem state that the agents
will attach probability 1 to the event that the asymptotic diﬀerence between their beliefs will
disappear when (13) holds, and they will attach probability 1 to asymptotic disagreement when
(13) fails to hold. Thus condition (13) completely characterizes the behavior of asymptotic
beliefs under approximate certainty.
It is also informative to understand for which classes of determining distributions f condi-
tion (13) holds. Clearly, this will depend on the tail behavior of f, which, in turn, determines
the behavior of the family of subjective densities
n
fi
θ,m
o
. Suppose x ≡ ˆ p1+ˆ p2−1 > ˆ p1− ˆ p2 ≡
y>0. Then, condition (13) can be expressed as
lim
m→∞
f (mx)
f (my)
=0 .
This condition holds for distributions with exponential tails, such as the exponential or the
normal distributions. On the other hand, it fails for distributions with polynomial tails. For
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Figure 2: limn→∞ φi
n (s) for Pareto distribution as a function of ρ(s) [α =2 , ˆ pi =3 /4.]
example, consider the Pareto distribution, where f (x) is proportional to |x|
−α for some α>1.
Then, for each m,
f (mx)
f (my)
=
µ
x
y
¶−α
> 0,
so that the agents’ beliefs will diverge after observing the sequence of the signals. For this
particular distribution, the asymptotic parameters will be independent of m,a sRi
m does not
depend on m.I fw et a k eπ1 = π2 =1 /2, then, the asymptotic posterior probability of θ = A
according to i is
φi
∞,m (ρ(s)) =
¡
ρ(s) − ˆ pi¢−α
(ρ(s) − ˆ pi)
−α +( ρ(s)+ˆ pi − 1)
−α
for any m.
As illustrated in Figure 2, in this case φi
∞,m is not monotone. To see the magnitude of
asymptotic disagreement, consider ρ(s) ∼ = ˆ pi.I nt h a tc a s e ,φi
∞,m (ρ(s)) is approximately 1, and
φj
∞,m (ρ(s)) is approximately y−α/(x−α + y−α). Hence, both agents believe that the diﬀerence
between their asymptotic posteriors will be
¯ ¯φ1
∞,m − φ2
∞,m
¯ ¯ ∼ =
x−α
x−α + y−α.
This asymptotic diﬀerence is increasing with the diﬀerence y ≡ ˆ p1 − ˆ p2, which corresponds to
the diﬀerence in the agents’ views on which frequencies of signals are likely. It is also clear
that this asymptotic diﬀerence will converge to zero as y → 0.11 This last statement is indeed
generally true because R(x,0) = 0, which implies the following corollary:
11Recall that in Example 1, the asymptotic diﬀerence remained bounded away from zero, independent of
ˆ p
1 − ˆ p
2. The main reason for this diﬀerence is that here (as in Theorem 5) limm→0 R
i
m (ρ) is a continuous
function of ρ for relevant values of ρ, while in Example 1 R
i (ρ) was discontinuous in   at the limit.
20Corollary 1 In Theorem 5, suppose subjective densities are such that ˆ p1 =ˆ p2.T h e n , f o r
every λ>0 and δ>0,t h e r ee x i s t s¯ m ∈ (0,∞) such that for all m>¯ m and each i =1 ,2,w e
have
Pri
³
lim
n→∞
¯ ¯φ1
n,m − φ2
n,m
¯ ¯ >λ
´
<δ .
This corollary implies that if the agents are almost certain about the informativeness of
signals, then any signiﬁcant diﬀerence in their asymptotic beliefs must be due to the diﬀerence
in their subjective densities regarding the signal distribution (i.e., it must be the case that
ˆ p1 6=ˆ p2). However, recall that the requirement ˆ p1 =ˆ p2 is rather strong. For example,
Theorem 1 established that under certainty there will be asymptotic learning and agreement
for all ˆ p1, ˆ p2 > 1/2.
Now let us suppose that ˆ p1 6=ˆ p2. Then, again using condition (13), we can characterize
which determining functions f will lead to families of distributions that ensure asymptotic
learning and agreement under approximate certainty. We ﬁrst deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 1 Ad e n s i t yf u n c t i o nf has regularly-varying tails if it has unbounded support and
satisﬁes
lim
m→∞
f(mx)
f(m)
= H(x) ∈ R
for any x>0.
The condition in Deﬁnition 1 that H (x) ∈ R is relatively weak, but nevertheless has
important implications. In particular, it implies that H(x) ≡ x−α for α ∈ (0,∞).T h i sf o l l o w s
f r o mt h ef a c tt h a ti nt h el i m i t ,t h ef u n c t i o nH (·) must be a solution to the functional equation
H(x)H(y)=H(xy), which is only possible if H(x) ≡ x−α for α ∈ (0,∞).12 Moreover, Seneta
(1976) shows that the convergence in Deﬁnition 1 holds locally uniformly, i.e., uniformly in x
in any compact subset of (0,∞). This implies that if a density f has regularly-varying tails,
then the assumptions imposed in Theorem 5 (in particular, uniform-convergence assumption)
are satisﬁe d ,a n di nf a c t ,w eh a v et h a t ˜ R deﬁn e di n( 7 )i sg i v e nb y
˜ R(x,y)=
µ
x
y
¶−α
,
12To see this, note that since limm→∞ (f(mx)/f(m)) = H (x) ∈ R,w eh a v e
H (xy) = lim
m→∞
µ
f(mxy)
f(m)
¶
=l i m
m→∞
µ
f(mxy)
f(my)
f(my)
f (m)
¶
= H (x)H (y).
See de Haan (1970) or Feller (1971).
21and is continuous everywhere.
As Deﬁnition 1 makes clear, densities with regularly-varying tails behave approximately like
power functions in the tails; indeed a density f (x) with regularly-varying tails can be written
as f(x)=L(x)x−α for some slowly-varying function L (with limm→∞ L(mx)/L(m)=1 ).
Many common distributions, including the Pareto and t-distributions, have regularly-varying
densities. We also deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 2 Ad e n s i t yf u n c t i o nf has rapidly-varying tails if it satisﬁes
lim
m→∞
f (mx)
f (m)
= x−∞ ≡
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if x > 1
1 if x =1
∞ if x < 1
for any x>0.
As in Deﬁnition 1, the above convergence holds locally uniformly (uniformly in x in any
compact subset that excludes 1). Examples of densities with rapidly-varying tails include the
exponential and the normal densities.
From these deﬁnitions, the following corollary to Theorem 5 is immediate:
Corollary 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and ˆ p1 6=ˆ p2.
1. If in Theorem 5 f has regularly-varying tails, then there exists λ>0 such that for each
δ>0,t h e r ee x i s t s¯ m ∈ Z+ such that for i =1 ,2 and all m>¯ m,
Pri
³
lim
n→∞
¯ ¯φ1
n,m (s) − φ2
n,m (s)
¯ ¯ >λ
´
> 1 − δ.
2. If in Theorem 5 f has rapidly-varying tails, then for every λ>0 and δ>0,t h e r ee x i s t s
¯ m ∈ Z+ such that for i =1 ,2 and all m>¯ m,
Pri
³
lim
n→∞
¯ ¯φ1
n,m (s) − φ2
n,m (s)
¯ ¯ >λ
´
<δ .
This corollary therefore implies that whether there will be asymptotic learning and agree-
ment depends on whether the family of subjective densities converging to “certainty” has
regularly or rapidly-varying tails (provided that ˆ p1 6=ˆ p2).
223 Generalizations
The previous section provided our main results in an environment with two states and two
signals. In this section, we show that our main results generalize to an environment with K ≥ 2
states and L ≥ K signals. The main results parallel those of Section 2, and all the proofs for
this section are contained in the Appendix.
To generalize our results to this environment, let θ ∈ Θ,w h e r eΘ ≡
©
A1,...,A Kª
is a set
containing K ≥ 2 distinct elements. We refer to a generic element of the set by Ak. Similarly,
let st ∈
©
a1,...,a Lª
,w i t hL ≥ K signal values. As before, deﬁne s ≡ {st}
∞
t=1,a n df o re a c h
l =1 ,...,L,l e t
rl
n (s) ≡
¯ ¯ ¯
n
t ≤ n|st = al
o¯ ¯ ¯
be the number of times the signal st = al out of ﬁrst n signals. Once again, the strong law
of large numbers implies that, according to both agents, for each l =1 ,...,L, rl
n (s)/n almost
surely converges to some ρl (s) ∈ [0,1] with
PL
l=1 ρl (s)=1 .D e ﬁne ρ(s) ∈ ∆(L) as the vector
ρ(s) ≡
¡
ρ1 (s),...,ρ L (s)
¢
,w h e r e∆(L) ≡
n
p =
¡
p1,...,p L¢
∈ [0,1]
L :
PL
l=1 pl =1
o
,a n dl e t
the set ¯ S be
¯ S ≡
n
s ∈ S :l i m n→∞ rl
n (s)/n exists for each l =1 ,...,L
o
. (14)
With analogy to the two-state-two-signal model in Section 2, let πi
k > 0 be the prior probability
individual i assigns to θ = Ak, πi ≡
¡
πi
1,...,πi
K
¢
,a n dpl
θ be the frequency of observing signal
s = al when the true state is θ. When players are certain about pl
θ’s as in usual models,
immediate generalizations of Theorems 1 and 2 apply. With analogy to before we deﬁne Fi
θ as
the joint subjective probability distribution of conditional frequencies p ≡
¡
p1
θ,...,p L¢
according
to individual i. Since our focus is learning under uncertainty, we impose an assumption similar
to Assumption 1.
Assumption 2 For each i and θ, the distribution Fi
θ over ∆(L) has a continuous, non-zero
and ﬁnite density fi
θ over ∆(L).
We also deﬁne φi
k,n(s) ≡ Pri ¡
θ = Ak |{ st}
n
t=0
¢
for each k =1 ,...,K as the posterior
probability that θ = Ak after observing the sequence of signals {st}
n
t=0,a n d
φi
k,∞ (ρ(s)) ≡ lim
n→∞φi
k,n(s).
23Given this structure, it is straightforward to generalize the results in Section 2. Let us now
deﬁne the transformation Tk : RK
+ → RK−1
+ , such that
Tk (x)=
µ
xk0
xk
;k0 ∈ {1,...,K}\k
¶
.
Here Tk (x) is taken as a column vector. This transformation will play a useful role in the
theorems and the proofs. In particular, this transformation will be applied to the vector πi of
priors to determine the ratio of priors assigned the diﬀerent states by individual i.L e tu sa l s o
deﬁne the norm kxk =m a x l |x|l for x =
¡
x1,...,x L¢
∈ RL.
The next lemma generalizes Lemma 1:
Lemma 3 Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then for all s ∈ ¯ S,
φi
k,∞ (ρ(s)) =
1
1+
P
k06=k πi
k0fi
Ak0(ρ(s))
πi
kfi
Ak(ρ(s))
. (15)
Our ﬁrst theorem in this section parallels Theorem 3 and shows that under Assumption
2 there will be lack of asymptotic learning, and under a relatively weak additional condition,
there will also asymptotic disagreement.
Theorem 6 Suppose Assumption 2 holds for i =1 ,2, then for each k =1 ,...,K,a n df o re a c h
i =1 ,2,
1. Pri ¡
φi
k,∞ (ρ(s)) 6=1 |θ = Ak¢
=1 ,and
2. Pri ¡¯ ¯φ1
k,∞ (ρ(s)) − φ2
k,∞ (ρ(s))
¯ ¯ 6=0
¢
=1whenever Pri((Tk
¡
π1¢
−Tk
¡
π2¢
)0Tk(fi(ρ(s)) =
0) = 0 and F1
θ = F2
θ for each θ ∈ Θ.
The additional condition in part 2 of Theorem 6, that Pri((Tk
¡
π1¢
−Tk
¡
π2¢
)0Tk(fi(ρ(s)) =
0) = 0,p l a y st h er o l eo fd i ﬀerences in priors in Theorem 3 (here “ 0 ” denotes the transpose
of the vector in question). In particular, if this condition did not hold, then at some ρ(s),t h e
relative asymptotic likelihood of some states could be the same according to two individuals
with diﬀerent priors and they would interpret at least some sequences of signals in a similar
manner and achieve asymptotic agreement. It is important to note that the condition that
Pri((Tk
¡
π1¢
− Tk
¡
π2¢
)0Tk(fi(ρ(s)) = 0) = 0 is relatively weak and holds generically–i.e., if
24it did not hold, a small perturbation of π1 or π2 would restore it.13 The part 2 of Theorem 6
therefore implies that asymptotic disagreement occurs generically.
The next theorem shows that small diﬀerences in priors can again widen after observing
the same sequence of signals.
Theorem 7 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds, 10
³
Tk
³¡
f1
θ (ρ)
¢
θ∈Θ
´
− Tk
³¡
f2
θ (ρ)
¢
θ∈Θ
´´
6=0
for each ρ ∈ [0,1],e a c hk =1 ,...,K,w h e r e1 ≡ (1,...,1)0.T h e n ,t h e r ee x i s t sa no p e ns e to f
prior vectors π1 and π2, such that
¯ ¯φ1
k,∞ (ρ(s)) − φ2
k,∞ (ρ(s))
¯ ¯ >
¯ ¯π1
k − π2
k
¯ ¯ for each k =1 ,...,K and s ∈ ¯ S
and
Pri ¡¯ ¯φ1
k,∞ (ρ(s)) − φ2
k,∞ (ρ(s))
¯ ¯ >
¯ ¯π1
k − π2
k
¯ ¯¢
=1for each k =1 ,...,K.
The condition 10
³
Tk
³¡
f1
θ (ρ)
¢
θ∈Θ
´
− Tk
³¡
f2
θ (ρ)
¢
θ∈Θ
´´
6=0is similar to the additional
condition in part 2 of Theorem 6, and as with that condition, it is relatively weak and holds
generically. Finally, the following theorem generalizes Theorem 5. The appropriate construc-
tion of the families of probability densities is also provided in the theorem.
Theorem 8 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. For each θ ∈ Θ and m ∈ Z+,d e ﬁne the
subjective density fi
θ,m by
fi
θ,m(p)=c(i,θ,m)f (m(p − ˆ p(i,θ))) (16)
where c(i,θ,m) ≡ 1/
R
p∈∆(L) f (m(p − ˆ p(i,θ)))dp, ˆ p(i,θ) ∈ ∆(L) with ˆ p(i,θ) 6=ˆ p
¡
i,θ0¢
when-
ever θ 6= θ0,a n df : RL → R is a positive, continuous probability density function that satisﬁes
the following conditions:
(i) limh→∞ max{x:kxk≥h} f (x)=0 ,
(ii)
˜ R(x,y) ≡ lim
m→∞
f (mx)
f (my)
(17)
13More formally, the set of solutions S ≡ {
¡
π
1,π
2,ρ
¢
∈ ∆(L)
2 :( Tk
¡
π
1¢
− Tk
¡
π
2¢
)
0Tk(f
i(ρ)) = 0} has
Lebesgue measure 0. This is a consequence of the Preimage Theorem and Sard’s Theorem in diﬀerential
topology (see, for example, Guillemin and Pollack, 1974, pp. 21 and 39). The Preimage Theorem implies that
if y is a regular value of a map f : X → Y ,t h e nf
−1 (y) is a submanifold of X with dimension equal to
dimX −dimY . In our context, this implies that if 0 i sar e g u l a rv a l u eo ft h em a p(Tk
¡
π
1¢
−Tk
¡
π
2¢
)
0Tk(f
i(ρ)),
then the set S is a two dimensional submanifold of ∆(L)
3 and thus has Lebesgue measure 0. Sard’s theorem
implies that 0 is generically a regular value.
25exists at all x,y,a n d
(iii) convergence in (17) holds uniformly over a neighborhood of each
¡
ˆ p(i,θ) − ˆ p
¡
j,θ0¢
, ˆ p(i,θ) − ˆ p(j,θ)
¢
.A l s ol e tφi
k,∞,m (ρ(s)) ≡ limn→∞ φi
k,n,m(s) be the asymp-
totic posterior of agent i with subjective density fi
θ,m.T h e n ,
1. limm→∞
³
φi
k,∞,m
¡
ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢¢
− φ
j
k,∞,m
¡
ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢¢´
=0if and only if
˜ R
³
ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢
− ˆ p
³
j,Ak0´
, ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢
− ˆ p
¡
j,Ak¢´
=0for each k0 6= k.
2. If ˜ R
¡
ˆ p(i,θ) − ˆ p
¡
j,θ0¢
, ˆ p(i,θ) − ˆ p(j,θ)
¢
=0for each distinct θ and θ0, then for every
λ>0 and δ>0,t h e r ee x i s t s¯ m ∈ Z+ such that for i =1 ,2 and all m>¯ m,
Pri ¡° °φ1
∞,m (s) − φ2
∞,m (s)
° ° >λ
¢
<δ .
3. If ˜ R
¡
ˆ p(i,θ) − ˆ p
¡
j,θ0¢
, ˆ p(i,θ) − ˆ p(j,θ)
¢
6=0for each distinct θ and θ0,t h e nt h e r ee x i s t s
λ>0 such that for each δ>0,t h e r ee x i s t s¯ m ∈ Z+ such that for i =1 ,2 and all m>¯ m,
Pri ¡° °φ1
∞,m (s) − φ2
∞,m (s)
° ° >λ
¢
> 1 − δ.
These theorems therefore show that the results about lack of asymptotic learning and
asymptotic agreement derived in the previous section do not depend on the assumption that
there are only two states and binary signals. It is also straightforward to generalize Corollaries
1 and 2 to the case with multiple states and signals; we omit this to avoid repetition.
The results in this section are stated for the case in which both the number of signal values
and states are ﬁnite. They can also be generalized to the case of a continuum of signal values
and states, but this introduces a range of technical issues, which are not central to our focus
here.
4 Applications
In this section we discuss a number of applications of the results derived so far. The applications
are chosen to show various diﬀerent economic consequences from learning and disagreement
under uncertainty, but throughout, we strive to choose the simplest examples. The ﬁrst ex-
ample illustrates how learning under uncertainty can overturn some simple insights from basic
game theory. The second example shows how such learning can act as an equilibrium selec-
tion device as in Carlsson and van Damme (1993). The third example is the most substantial
26application and shows how learning under uncertainty aﬀects speculative asset trading. The
fourth example illustrates how learning under uncertainty can aﬀect the timing of agreement
in bargaining. Finally, the last example shows how a special case of our model of learning
under uncertainty can arise when there is information transmission by a potentially biased
media outlet.
4.1 Value of Information in Common-Interest Games
Consider a common-interest game in which the agents have identical payoﬀ functions. Typically
in common interest games information is valuable, in the sense that with more information
about underlying parameters, the value of the game in the best equilibrium will be higher.
Consequently, we would expect agents to collect or at least wait for the arrival of additional
information before playing such games. In contrast, we now show that when there is learning
under uncertainty, additional information can be harmful in common-interest games, and thus
agents may prefer to play the game before additional information arrives.
To illustrate these issues, consider the payoﬀ matrix
αβ
α θ,θ 1/2,1/2
β 1/2,1/2 1,1
where θ ∈ {0,2}, and the agents have a common prior on θ according to which probability of
θ =2is π ∈ (1/2,1). When there is no information, there are two equilibria in pure strategies:
(α,α)–the good equilibrium–and (β,β)–the bad equilibrium. The good equilibrium here
is both Pareto- and risk-dominant, and hence, it is plausible to presume that the players will
indeed choose to play this good equilibrium. In this equilibrium, each player would receive θ,
with expected payoﬀ of 2π>1.
First, consider the implications of learning under certainty. Suppose that the agents are
allowed to observe an inﬁnite sequence of signals s = {st}
∞
t=1, where each agent thinks that
Pri (st = θ|θ)=pi > 1/2. Theorem 1 then implies that after observing the signal, the agents
will learn θ. If the frequency ρ(s) of signal with st =2is greater than 1/2, they will learn that
θ =2 ; otherwise they will learn that θ =0 .I fρ(s) ≤ 1/2, β strictly dominates α, and hence
(β,β) is the only equilibrium. If ρ(s) > 1/2, as before, we have a good equilibrium (α,α),
which is Pareto- and risk-dominant, and a bad equilibrium (β,β). Assuming that they will
also play the good equilibrium in this game, we can conclude that information beneﬁts both
27agents; they will choose the best strategy proﬁle at each state and each will receive a payoﬀ of
max{θ,1} or an expected payoﬀ of 2π +( 1− π). Consequently, in this case we would expect
the players to wait for the arrival of public information before playing the game.
Let us next turn to learning under uncertainty. In particular, suppose that the agents do
not know the signal distribution and their subjective densities are similar to those in Example
2:
fi
θ (p)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
¡
1 −   −  2¢
/δ if ˆ pi − δ/2 ≤ p ≤ ˆ pi + δ/2
  if p<1/2
 2 otherwise
(18)
for each θ,w h e r e0 <δ<ˆ p1− ˆ p2 and   is taken to be arbitrarily small. Given these subjective
densities, we will see that according to both agents with probability greater than 1 −  , β will
be the unique rationalizable action, yielding the low payoﬀ of 1. Hence, as or as   → 0,t h e
arrival of public information will decrease each agent’s payoﬀ to 1. Consequently, both agents
would prefer to play the game before the information arrives.14
To show this, recall from Example 2 that when   ∼ = 0 (i.e., when   → 0), we have the
asymptotic posterior probability that θ =2as
φi
∞ (ρ(s)) ∼ =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
if ρ(s) < 1 − ˆ pi − δ/2,
1 or 1 − ˆ pi + δ/2 <ρ(s) < 1/2,
or ˆ pi − δ/2 ≤ ρ(s) ≤ ˆ pi + δ/2,
0 otherwise.
Notice that for any ρ(s) > 1/2, at least one of the agents will assign posterior probability
φi
∞ (ρ(s)) ∼ = 0 to the event that θ =2 , and therefore, for this agent, β will strictly dominate
α.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t (β,β) must be the unique rationalizable action proﬁle. When ρ(s) ∈
¡
1 − ˆ pi − δ/2,1 − ˆ pi + δ/2
¢
, agent i assigns probability φi
∞ (ρ(s)) ∼ = 0 to θ =2 , and again
(β,β) is the unique rationalizable action proﬁle for any such ρ(s). The probability of the
remaining set of frequencies is less than 1−  according to both agents. This implies that each
agent (correctly) expects that, if they wait for the arrival of public information, their payoﬀ
will be approximately 1, and would therefore prefer to play the game before the arrival of the
public information.
14Throughout the section we use “approximately” interchangeably with “as   → 0”o r“ a s  ∼ = 0”.
284.2 Selection in Coordination Games
The initial diﬀerence in players’ beliefs about the signal distribution need not be due to lack of
common prior; it may be due to private information. Building on an example by Carlsson and
van Damme (1993), we now illustrate that, when the players are uncertain about the signal
distribution, small diﬀerences in beliefs, combined with learning, may have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the outcome of the game and may select one of the multiple equilibria of the game.
Consider again with the payoﬀ matrix
IN
I θ,θ θ − 1,0
N 0,θ− 1 0,0
where θ ∼ N (0,1). The players observe an inﬁnite sequence of public signals s ≡ {st}
∞
t=0,
where st ∈ {0,1} and
Pr(st =1 |θ)=1 /(1 + exp(−(θ + η))), (19)
with η ∼ N (0,1). In addition, each player observes a private signal
xi = η + ui
where ui is uniformly distributed on [− /2, /2] for some small  >0.
Let us deﬁne κ ≡ log(ρ(s)) − log(1 − ρ(s)). Equation (19) implies that after observing s,
the players infer that θ +η = κ. For small  , conditional on xi, η is distributed approximately
uniformly on [xi −  /2,x i +  /2] (see Carlsson and van Damme, 1993). This implies that con-
ditional on xi and s, θ is approximately uniformly distributed on [κ − xi −  /2,κ− xi +  /2].
N o wn o t et h a tw i t ht h er e v e r s eo r d e ro nxi, the game is supermodular, and therefore, there exist
extremal rationalizable strategy proﬁles, which also constitute monotone, symmetric Bayesian
Nash Equilibria. In each equilibrium, there is a cutoﬀ value x∗, such that the equilibrium
action is I if xi <x ∗ and N if xi >x ∗. This cutoﬀ x∗ is deﬁned such that player i is indiﬀerent
between the two actions, i.e.,
κ − x∗ =P r ( xj >x ∗|xi = x∗)=1 /2+O( ),
where O( ) is such that lim →0 O( )=0 . This establishes that
x∗ = κ − 1/2 − O( ),
29and therefore, when   is small, the game is dominance solvable, and each player i plays I if
xi <κ− 1/2 and N if xi >κ+1 /2.
The implications of learning under certainty instead of uncertainty in this same game are
very diﬀerent. Suppose instead that the players knew the conditional signal distribution (i.e., if
they knew η), so that we are in a world of learning under certainty. Then after s is observed, θ
would become common knowledge, and there would be multiple equilibria whenever θ ∈ (0,1).
This example therefore illustrates how learning under uncertainty can lead to the selection of
one of the equilibria in a coordination game.
4.3 A Simple Model of Asset Trade
One of the most interesting applications of the ideas developed here is to models of asset
trading. Models of assets trading with diﬀerent priors have been studied by, among others,
Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Morris (1996). These models assume diﬀerent priors about
the dividend process and allow for learning under certainty. They establish the possibility of
“speculative asset trading”. We now investigate the implications of learning under uncertainty
for the pattern of speculative asset trading.
Consider an asset that pays 1 if the state is A and pays 0 if the state is B. Assume that
Agent 2 owns the asset, but Agent 1 may wish to buy it. We have two dates, τ =0and τ =1 ,
and the agents observe a sequence of signals between these dates. For simplicity, we again
take this to be an inﬁnite sequence s ≡ {st}
∞
t=1. We also simplify this example by assuming
that Agent 1 has all the bargaining power: at either date, if he wants to buy the asset, Agent
1m a k e sat a k e - i t - o r - l e a v e - i tp r i c eo ﬀer Pτ, and trade occurs at price Pτ if Agent 2 accepts
the oﬀer. Assume also that π1 >π 2, so that Agent 1 is more optimistic. This assumption
ensures that Agent 1 would like to purchase the asset. We are interested in subgame-perfect
equilibrium of this game.
Let us start with the case in which there is learning under certainty. Suppose that each
agent is certain that pA = pB = pi for some number pi > 1/2. In that case, from Theorem
1, both agents recognize at τ =0that at τ =1 ,f o re a c hρ(s), the value of the asset will the
same for both of them: it will be worth 1 if ρ(s) > 1/2 and 0 if ρ(s) < 1/2. Hence, at τ =1
the agents will be indiﬀerent between trading the asset (at price P1 = φ1
∞ (ρ(s)) = φ2
∞ (ρ(s)))
at each history ρ(s). Therefore, if trade does not occur at τ =0 , the continuation value of
Agent 1 is 0, and the continuation value of Agent 2 is π2. If they trade at price P0, then the
30continuation value of agents 1 and 2 will be π1 −P0 and P0, respectively. This implies that at
date 0, Agent 2 accepts an oﬀe ri fa n do n l yi fP0 ≥ π2.S i n c eπ1 >π 2, Agent 1 is happy to
oﬀer the price P0 = π2 at date τ =0and trade takes place. Therefore, with learning under
certainty, there will immediate trade at τ =0 .
We next turn to the case of learning under uncertainty and suppose that the agents do not
know pA and pB. To illustrate how learning under uncertainty may aﬀect the results, we ﬁrst
consider a simple example where subjective densities are as in Example 1, with   → 0.N o w ,a t
date 1, if ˆ p1−δ/2 <ρ(s) < ˆ p1+δ/2, then the value of the asset for Agent 2 is φ2
∞ (ρ(s)) = π2,
and the value of the asset for Agent 1 is approximately 1. Hence, at such ρ(s), Agent 1 buys the
a s s e tf r o mA g e n t2a tp r i c eP1 (ρ(s)) = π2, enjoying gains from trade equal to 1−π2.I f ,o nt h e
other hand, ˆ p2−δ/2 <ρ(s) < ˆ p2+δ/2 or 1−ˆ p1−δ/2 <ρ(s) < 1−ˆ p1+δ/2, then there will be no
trade. For example in the latter case, the value of the asset is approximately 0 for Agent 1 and
π2 for Agent 2, and the gains from trade is negative. Instead, if 1−ˆ p2−δ/2 <ρ(s) < 1−ˆ p2+δ/2,
then the value of the asset is π1 for Agent 1 and 0 for Agent 2, and they trade the asset at
price 0, leading to a gain from trade for Agent 1 equal to π1.A ta n yo t h e rρ(s), the agents
do not change their prior beliefs, so that they trade at the price π2.
Given this behavior, we can now compute the continuation values of the agents if they do
not trade at date 0. Since Agent 2 is always indiﬀerent between selling his asset and not doing
so, his continuation value if π2. On the other hand, Agent 1 thinks that approximately with
probability π1, ˆ p1 − δ/2 <ρ (s) < ˆ p1 + δ/2,w h e nh eg e t s1 − π2, and approximately with
probability 1−π1, 1− ˆ p1 −δ/2 <ρ(s) < 1− ˆ p1 +δ/2, when he gets 0. His continuation value
is therefore approximately
π1 ¡
1 − π2¢
.
At date 0, Agent 2 accepts the price oﬀer of Agent 1, P0,i fa n do n l yi fP0 ≥ π2.A g e n t 1 ’ s
payoﬀ of buying the asset at price π2 is therefore π1 − π2.S i n c eπ1 ¡
1 − π2¢
>π 1 − π2,t h e r e
will be no trade at τ =0 . Instead, Agent 1 will wait for the information to buy the asset at
date 1 (provided that ρ(s) turns out to be in a range where he concludes that the asset pays
1).
This example exploits the general intuition discussed after Theorem 4: if the agents are
uncertain about the informativeness of the signals, each agent may expect to learn more from
the signals than the other agent. In fact, this example has the extreme feature whereby each
31agent believes that he will deﬁnitely learn the true state, but the other agent will fail to do
so. This induces the agents to wait for the arrival of the additional information before trading.
This contrasts with the intuition that observation of common information should take agents
towards common beliefs and make trades less likely. This intuition is correct in models of
learning under certainty and is the reason why previous models have generated speculative
trade at the beginning (Harrison and Kreps, 1978, and Morris, 1996). Instead, here there is
delayed speculative trading.
The next result characterizes the conditions for delayed asset trading more generally:
Proposition 1 In any subgame-perfect equilibrium, the trade is delayed to τ =1if and only
if
E2 £
φ2
∞
¤
= π2 >E 1 £
min
©
φ1
∞,φ 2
∞
ª¤
.
That is, when π2 >E 1 £
min
©
φ1
∞,φ 2
∞
ª¤
, then Agent 1 does not buy at τ =0and buys at τ =1
if φ1
∞ (ρ(s)) >φ 2
∞ (ρ(s));w h e nπ2 <E 1 £
min
©
φ1
∞,φ 2
∞
ª¤
, Agent 1 buys at τ =0 .
Proof. In any subgame-perfect equilibrium, Agent 2 is indiﬀerent between trading and not,
and hence his valuation of the asset is Pr2 (θ = A|Information). Therefore, trade at τ =0can
take place at the price P0 = π2,w h i l et r a d ea tτ =1will be at the price P1 (ρ(s)) = φ2
∞ (ρ(s)).
At date 1, Agent 1 buys the asset if and only if φ1
∞ (ρ(s)) ≥ φ2
∞ (ρ(s)), yielding the payoﬀ of
max
©
φ1
∞ (ρ(s)) − φ2
∞ (ρ(s)),0
ª
. This implies that Agent 1 is willing to buy at τ =0if and
only if
π1 − π2 ≥ E1 £
max
©
φ1
∞ (ρ(s)) − φ2
∞ (ρ(s)),0
ª¤
= E1 £
φ1
∞ (ρ(s)) − min
©
φ1
∞ (ρ(s)),φ 2
∞ (ρ(s))
ª¤
= π1 − E1 £
min
©
φ1
∞ (ρ(s)),φ 2
∞ (ρ(s))
ª¤
,
as claimed.
Since π1 = E1 £
φ1
∞
¤
≥ E1 £
min
©
φ1
∞,φ 2
∞
ª¤
, this result provides a cutoﬀ v a l u ef o rt h ei n i t i a l
diﬀerence in beliefs, π1 − π2, in terms of the diﬀerences in the agents’ interpretation of the
signals. The cutoﬀ value is E1 £
max
©
φ1
∞ (ρ(s)) − φ2
∞ (ρ(s)),0
ª¤
. If the initial diﬀerence is
lower than this value, then they will wait until τ =1to trade; otherwise they will trade
immediately. Consistent with the above example, delay in trading becomes more likely when
the agents interpret the signals more diﬀerently, which is evident from the expression for the
32cutoﬀ value. This reasoning also suggests that, if F1
θ = F2
θ for each θ (so that the agents
interpret the signals in a similar fashion),15 then trade should occur immediately. The next
lemma shows that each agent believes that additional information will bring the other agent’s
expectations closer to his own a n dw i l lb eu s e dt op r o v et h a tF1
θ = F2
θ indeed implies immediate
trading.
Lemma 4 If π1 >π 2 and F1
θ = F2
θ for each θ,t h e n
E1 £
φ2
∞
¤
≥ π2.
Proof. Recall that ex ante expectation of individual i regarding φj
∞ can be written as
Ei £
φj
∞
¤
=
Z 1
0
£
πifi
A (ρ)φj
∞ (ρ)+
¡
1 − πi¢
fi
B (1 − ρ)φj
∞ (ρ)
¤
dρ. (20)
=
Z 1
0
πifA (ρ)+
¡
1 − πi¢
fB (1 − ρ)
πjfA (ρ)+( 1− πj)fB (1 − ρ)
fA (ρ)dρ,
where the ﬁrst line uses the deﬁnition of ex ante expectation under the probability measure
Pri, while the second line exploits equations (3) and (4) and the fact that since F1
θ = F2
θ ,
f1
θ (ρ)=f2
θ (ρ)=fθ (ρ) for all ρ.N o wd e ﬁne
I (π) ≡
Z 1
0
πfA (ρ)+( 1− π)fB (1 − ρ)
π2fA (ρ)+( 1− π2)fB (1 − ρ)
fA (ρ)dρ.
From (20), E1 £
φ2
∞
¤
= I
¡
π1¢
and π2 = E2 £
φ2
∞
¤
= I
¡
π2¢
.H e n c e ,i ts u ﬃces to show that I is
increasing in π.N o w ,
I0 (π)=
Z 1
0
fA (ρ)
π2fA (ρ)+( 1− π2)fB (1 − ρ)
(fA (ρ) − fB (1 − ρ))dρ.
Moreover, fA (ρ)/
£
π2fA (ρ)+
¡
1 − π2¢
fB (1 − ρ)
¤
≥ 1 if and only if fA (ρ) ≥ fB (1 − ρ).
Hence,
I0 (π)=
Z
fA≥fB
fA (ρ)
π2fA (ρ)+( 1− π2)fB (1 − ρ)
(fA (ρ) − fB (1 − ρ))dρ
−
Z
fA<fB
fA (ρ)
π2fA (ρ)+( 1− π2)fB (1 − ρ)
(fB (1 − ρ) − fA (ρ))dρ
≥
Z
fA≥fB
(fA (ρ) − fB (1 − ρ))dρ −
Z
fA<fB
(fB (1 − ρ) − fA (ρ))dρ
=
Z 1
0
(fA (ρ) − fB (1 − ρ))dρ =0 .
15Recall from Theorem 3 that even when F
1
θ = F
2
θ , agents interpret signals diﬀerently because π
1 6= π
2.
33Together with the previous proposition, this lemma yields the following result establishing
that delay in asset trading can only occur when subjective probability distributions diﬀer across
individuals.
Proposition 2 If F1
θ = F2
θ for each θ, then in any subgame-perfect equilibrium, the trade
occurs at τ =0 .
Proof. Since π1 >π 2 and R1 = R2, Lemma 1 implies that φ1
∞ (ρ(s)) ≥ φ2
∞ (ρ(s)) for each
ρ(s). Then, E1 £
min
©
φ1
∞,φ 2
∞
ª¤
= E1 £
φ2
∞
¤
≥ π2, where the last inequality is by Lemma 4.
Therefore, by Proposition 1, Agent 1 buys at τ =0 .
This proposition therefore establishes thatw h e nt h et w oa g e n t sh a v et h es a m es u b j e c t i v e
probability distributions, there will not be delay in trading. However, as the example above
illustrates, when F1
θ 6= F2
θ , delayed speculative trading is possible. The intuition is given
by Lemma 4; when agents have the same subjective probability distribution but diﬀerent
priors, each will believe that additional information will make the other agent’s beliefs closer
to his own. This leads to early trading. However, when the agents diﬀer in terms of their
subjective probability distributions, they expect to learn more from new information (because,
as discussed after Theorem 4 above, they believe to have the “correct model of the world”).
Consequently, they delay trading.
Learning under uncertainty does not necessarily lead to additional delay in economic trans-
actions, however. Whether it does so or not depends on the eﬀect of the extent of disagreement
on the timing of economic transactions. We will next see that, in the context of bargaining,
the presence of learning under uncertainty may be a force towards immediate agreement rather
than delay.
4.4 Bargaining With Outside Options
Consider two agents bargaining over the division of a dollar. There are two dates τ ∈ {0,1},
and Agent 2 has an outside option θ ∈ {θL,θH} that expires at the end of date 1, where
θL <θ H < 1, and the value of θ is initially unknown. Between the two dates, the agents
observe an inﬁnite sequence of public signals s ≡ {st}
∞
t=1 with st ∈ {aL,a H}, where the signal
aL can be thought to be more likely under θL.
34Bargaining follows a simple protocol: at each date τ,A g e n t1o ﬀers a share wτ to Agent
2. If Agent 2 accepts the oﬀer, the game ends, Agent 2 receives the proposal, wτ,a n dA g e n t
1 receives the remaining 1 − wτ. If Agent 2 rejects the oﬀer, she decides whether to take her
outside option, terminating the game, or wait for the next stage of the game. We assume that
delay is costly, so that if negotiations continue until date τ =1 , Agent 1 incurs a cost c>0.
Finally, as in Yildiz (2003), the agents are assumed to be “optimistic”, in the sense that
y ≡ E2 [θ] − E1 [θ] > 0.
In other words, they diﬀer in their expectations of θ on the outside option of Agent 2–with
Agent 2 believing that her outside option is higher than Agent 1’s assessment of this outside
option. Clearly, y parameterizes the extent of optimism in this game.
We assume that the game form and beliefs are common knowledge and look for the subgame
perfect equilibrium of this simple bargaining game.
By backward induction, at date τ =1 ,f o ra n yρ(s), the value of outside option for Agent
1i sE2 [θ|ρ(s)] < 1, and hence she accepts an oﬀer w1 i fa n do n l yi fw1 ≥ E2 [θ|ρ(s)].A g e n t
2 therefore oﬀers w1 = E2 [θ|ρ(s)]. If there is no agreement at date 0, the continuation values
of the two agents are:
V 1 =1− c − E1 £
E2 [θ|ρ(s)]
¤
and V 2 = E2 £
E2 [θ|ρ(s)]
¤
= E2 [θ],
which uses the fact that there is no cost of delay for Agent 2. Since they have 1 dollar in total,
the agents will delay the agreement to date τ =1i fa n do n l yi f
E2 [θ] − E1 £
E2 [θ|ρ(s)]
¤
>c .
Here, E1 £
E2 [θ|ρ(s)]
¤
is Agent 1’s expectation about how Agent 2 will update her beliefs
after observing the signals s. If Agent 1 expects that the information will reduce Agent 2’s
expectation of her outside option more than the cost of waiting, then Agent 1 is willing to wait.
This description makes it clear that whether there will be agreement at date τ =0depends
on Agent 1’s assessment of how Agent 1 will interpret the (public) signals.
When each agent is certain about the informativeness of the signals, they agree ex ante that
they will interpret the information correctly. Consequently, as in Lemma 4, Agent 1’s Bayesian
updating will indicate that the public information will reveal him to be right. Yildiz (2004)
has shown that this reasoning gives Agent 1 an incentive to “wait to persuade” Agent 2 that
35her outside option is relatively low. More speciﬁcally, assume that each agent i is certain that
Pri (st = θ|θ)=ˆ pi > 1/2 for some ˆ p1 and ˆ p2,w h e r eˆ p1 and ˆ p2 may diﬀer. Then, from Theorem
1, the agents agree that Agent 2 will learn her outside option, i.e., Pri ¡
E2 [θ|ρ(s)] = θ
¢
=1
for each i.H e n c e ,E1 £
E2 [θ|ρ(s)]
¤
= E1 [θ]. Therefore, Agent 1 delays the agreement to date
τ =1i fa n do n l yi f
y>c ,
i.e., whether the level of optimism is higher than the cost of waiting. This discussion therefore
indicates that the arrival of public information can create a reason for delay in bargaining
games.
We now show that when agents are uncertain about the informativeness of the signals, this
motive for delay is reduced and that instead there can be immediate agreement. Intuitively,
each agent understands that the same signals will be interpreted diﬀerently by the other agent,
and thus expects that they are less likely to persuade the other agent. This decreases the
incentives to delay agreement.
This result is illustrated starkly here, with an example where a small amount of uncer-
tainty about the informativeness of signals removes all incentives to delay agreement. Suppose
that the agents’ beliefs are again as in Example 1 with   small. Now Agent 1 assigns proba-
bility more than 1 −   to the event that that ρ(s) will be either in
£
ˆ p − δ/2, ˆ p1 + δ/2
¤
or in
£
1 − ˆ p − δ/2,1 − ˆ p1 + δ/2
¤
, inducing Agent 2 to stick to her prior. Hence, Agent 1 expects
that Agent 2 will not update her prior by much. In particular, we have
E1 £
E2 [θ|ρ(s)]
¤
= E2 [θ]+O( ).
Thus
E2 [θ] − E1 £
E2 [θ|ρ(s)]
¤
= −O( ) <c .
This implies that agents will agree at the beginning of the game. Therefore, the same forces that
led to delayed asset trading in the previous subsection can also induce immediate agreement
in bargaining when agents are “optimistic”.
4.5 Manipulation and Uncertainty
Our ﬁnal example is intended to show how the pattern of uncertainty used in the body of the
paper can result from game theoretic interactions between an agent and an informed party
36with an interest, for example as in cheap talk games (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). Since our
purpose is to illustrate this possibility, we choose the simplest environment to communicate
these ideas and limit the discussion to the single agent setting–the generalization to the case
with two or more agents is straightforward.
The environment is as follows. The state of the world is θ ∈ {0,1}, and the agent starts
with a prior belief π ∈ (0,1) that θ =1at t =0 .A t t i m e t =1 , this agent has to make a
decision x ∈ [0,1], and his payoﬀ is −(x − θ)
2. Thus the agent would like to form as accurate
an expectation about θ as possible.
The other player is a media outlet, M, which observes a large (inﬁnite) number of signals
s0 ≡ {s0
t}
∞
t=1 with s0
t ∈ {0,1}, and makes a sequence of reports to the agent s ≡ {st}
∞
t=1
with st ∈ {0,1}. The reports s can be thought of as contents of newspaper articles, while s0
correspond to the information that the newspaper collects before writing the articles. Since s0
is an exchangeable sequence, we can represent it, as before, with the fraction of signals that
are 1’s, denoted by ρ0 ∈ [0,1],a n ds i m i l a r l ys is represented by ρ ∈ [0,1].T h i si sc o n v e n i e n t
as it allows us to model the mixed strategy of the media as a mapping
σM :[ 0 ,1] → ∆([0,1]),
where ∆([0,1]) is the set of probability distributions on [0,1].L e t i be the strategy that
puts probability 1 on the identity mapping, thus corresponding to M reporting truthfully.
Otherwise, i.e., if σM 6= i, there is manipulation (or misreporting) on the part of the media
outlet M.
We also assume for simplicity that ρ0 has a continuous distribution with density g1 when
θ =1and g0 when θ =0 , such that g1 (ρ)=0for all ρ ≤ ¯ ρ and g1 (ρ) > 0 for all ρ>¯ ρ,w h i l e
g0 (ρ) > 0 for all ρ ≤ ¯ ρ and g0 (ρ)=0for all ρ>¯ ρ. This assumption implies that if M reports
truthfully, i.e., σM = i, then Theorem 2 applies and implies that there will be asymptotic
learning (and also asymptotic agreement when there are more than one agent).
Now suppose instead that there are three diﬀerent types of the player M (unobservable
to the agent). With probability λH ∈ (0,1), the media is honest and can only play σH
M = i
(where the superscript is for type H–honest). With probability λα ∈ (0,1 − λH), the media
outlet is of type α a n di sb i a s e dt o w a r d s1.T y p e α media outlet receives utility equal to x
irrespective of ρ0, and hence would like to manipulate the agent to choose high values of x.
With the complementary probability λβ =1− λα − λH, the media outlet is of type β and is
37biased towards 0, and receives utility equal to 1 − x.
Let us now look for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game between the media outlet
and the agent. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium can be represented by two reporting functions
σα
M :[ 0 ,1] → ∆([0,1]) and σ
β
M :[ 0 ,1] → ∆([0,1]) for the two biased types of M, and updating
function φ :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1], which determines the belief of the agent that θ =1when the
sequence of reports is ρ, and an action function x :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1], which determines the
choice of the agent as a function of ρ (there is no loss of generality here in restricting to pure
strategies).
In equilibrium, x must be optimal for the agent given φ; φ must be derived from Bayes
rule given σα
M, σ
β
M and the prior π,a n dσα
M and σ
β
M must be optimal for the two biased media
outlets given x.
A ﬁrst observation is that since the payoﬀ to the biased of media outlets does not depend
on the true ρ0, without loss of any generality, we can restrict σα
M and σ
β
M not to depend on ρ0.
Then, with a slight abuse of quotation, let σα
M (ρ) and σ
β
M (ρ) be the respective densities with
which these two types report ρ.
Second, clearly the optimal choice of the agent after observing a sequence of signals with
fraction ρ being equal to 1 is
x(ρ)=φ(ρ),
for all ρ ∈ [0,1], i.e., the agent will choose an action equal to his belief φ(ρ).
Third, a straightforward application of Bayes’ rule implies the following belief for the agent:
φ(ρ)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
³
λασα
M(ρ)+λβσ
β
M(ρ)
´
π
(1−π)λHg0(ρ)+λασα
M(ρ)+λβσ
β
M(ρ) if ρ ≤ ¯ ρ
³
λHg1(ρ)+λασα
M(ρ)+λβσ
β
M(ρ)
´
π
πλHg1(ρ)+λασα
M(ρ)+λβσ
β
M(ρ) if ρ>¯ ρ
(21)
The following lemma shows that any (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium has a very simple form:
Lemma 5 In any equilibrium, there exist φA >πand φB <πsuch that φ(ρ)=φB for all
ρ<¯ ρ and φ(ρ)=φA for all ρ>¯ ρ.
Proof. From (21), φ(ρ) <πwhen ρ<¯ ρ,a n dφ(ρ) >πwhen ρ>¯ ρ. Since the media type
α maximizes x(ρ)=φ(ρ),w eh a v eσα
M (ρ)=0for ρ<¯ ρ. Now suppose that the lemma is false
and there exists ρ1,ρ 2 ≤ ¯ ρ such that φ(ρ1) >φ(ρ2). Then, we also have σ
β
M (ρ1)=0 –since
38media type β minimizes x(ρ)=φ(ρ). But in that case equation (21) implies that φ(ρ1)=0 ,
contradicting the hypothesis. Therefore, φ(ρ) is constant over ρ ∈ [0,¯ ρ). The proof for φ(ρ)
being constant over ρ ∈ (¯ ρ,1] is analogous.
It follows immediately from this lemma that equilibrium beliefs will take the form given in
the next proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that ρ 6=¯ ρ, then the unique equilibrium actions and beliefs are:
σα
M (ρ)=g1 (ρ) (22)
σ
β
M (ρ)=g0 (ρ) (23)
x(ρ)=φ(ρ)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
λβπ
(1−π)λH+λβ if ρ<¯ ρ
π(λH+λα)
πλH+λα if ρ>¯ ρ
. (24)
Proof. Consider the case ρ<¯ ρ. As in the proof of Lemma 5, σα
M (ρ)=0 .S i n c eφ(ρ) is
constant over ρ ∈ [0,¯ ρ) (by Lemma 5), equation (21) implies that σ
β
M is proportional to g0 on
this range. Since this range is the common support of the densities σ
β
M and g0,i tm u s tb et h a t
σ
β
M = g0. Similarly, σα
M = g1. Substituting these equalities in (21), we obtain (24).
The interesting implication of this proposition is that the unique equilibrium of the game
between the media outlet and the agent leads to a special case of our model of learning under
uncertainty. In particular, the beliefs in (24) can be obtained by the appropriate choice of
the functions fA (·) and fB (·) from equation (3) in Section 2. This illustrates that the type
of learning under uncertainty analyzed in this paper is likely to emerge in game-theoretic
situations where one of the players is trying to manipulate the beliefs of others.
5 Concluding Remarks
A key assumption of most theoretical analyses is that individuals have a “common prior,” mean-
ing that they have beliefs consistent with each other regarding the game forms, institutions,
and possible distributions of payoﬀ-relevant parameters. This presumption is often justiﬁed
by the argument that suﬃcient common experiences and observations, either through indi-
vidual observations or transmission of information from others, will eliminate disagreements,
taking agents towards common priors. This presumption receives support from a number of
39well-known theorems in statistics and economics, for example, Savage (1954) or Blackwell and
Dubins (1962).
However, existing theorems apply to environments in which there is learning under cer-
tainty, that is, individuals are certain about the meaning of diﬀerent signals. In many situa-
tions, individuals are not only learning about a payoﬀ-relevant parameter, but also about the
interpretation of diﬀerent signals. This takes us to the realm of environments where learning
takes place under uncertainty. For example, many signals favoring a particular interpretation
might make individuals suspicious that the signals come from a biased source. In the language
of statistics/econometrics, learning in environments with uncertainty leads to a situation in
which there is lack of full identiﬁcation. In such situations, information will be useful to
individuals, but may not lead to full learning.
This paper systematically investigates whether learning under uncertainty will take individ-
uals towards common priors (or asymptotic agreement). We consider an environment in which
two individuals with diﬀerent priors observe the same inﬁnite sequence of signals informative
about some underlying parameter. Learning is under uncertainty, in the sense that individuals
have non-degenerate subjective probability distribution over the likelihood of diﬀerent signals
given diﬀerent values of the parameter. We show that, under suﬃcient uncertainty, individuals
will never agree, even after observing the same inﬁnite sequence of signals. Perhaps even more
important, we show that this corresponds to a result of “agreement to eventually disagree”;
individuals will agree, before observing the sequence of signals, that their posteriors about the
underlying parameter will not converge. This common understanding that more information
may not lead to similar beliefs for the agents has important implications for a variety of games
and economic models.
We further show that after observing the same sequence of signals, two rational individuals
may end up disagreeing more than they originally did. This result contrasts with the common
presumption that shared information and experiences will take individuals’ assessments closer
to each other.
We also show that our results do not rely on a large amount of uncertainty. Our key
results regarding asymptotic disagreement (and lack of learning) may prevail even under “ap-
proximate certainty”–i.e., as we look at the limiting distribution where uncertainty about the
interpretation of signals disappears. In particular, we show that as we consider a family of
40subjective probability distributions converging to a degenerate distribution (thus to an envi-
ronment with certainty), whether there will be asymptotic learning and agreement depends
on whether this family of distributions has regularly- or rapidly varying tails. With regularly-
varying tails, such as for the Pareto, the log-normal or the t-distribution, even convergence to
certainty–i.e., approximate certainty–is not suﬃcient to ensure agreement.
Lack of common beliefs and common priors has important implications for economic behav-
ior in a range of circumstances. We illustrated how the type of learning outlined in this paper
interacts with economic behavior in various diﬀerent situations, including games of coordina-
tion, games of common interest, bargaining, asset trading and games of communication. For
example, we showed that contrary to standard results, individuals may wish to play common-
interest games before rather than after receiving more information about payoﬀs. Similarly, we
showed how the possibility of observing the same sequence of signals may lead to “speculative
delay” in asset trading among individuals that start with similar beliefs. We also provided
a simple example illustrating a potential reason why individuals may be uncertain about in-
formativeness of signals–the strategic behavior of other agents trying to manipulate their
beliefs.
It is also useful to note that the issues raised here have important implications for statis-
tics and econometrics as well as learning in game-theoretic situations. As noted above, the
environment considered here corresponds to one in which there is lack of full identiﬁcation.
Nevertheless, Bayesian posteriors are well-behaved and converge to a limiting distribution.
Studying the limiting properties of these posteriors more generally and how they may be used
for inference in under-identiﬁed econometric models is an interesting area for research.
416A p p e n d i x : O m i t t e d P r o o f s
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 . Under the hypothesis of the theorem and with the notation in (2), we have
Pr
i (rn|θ = B)
Pr
i (rn|θ = A)
=
¡
ˆ pi¢n−rn (1 − ˆ pi)rn
(ˆ pi)
rn (1 − ˆ pi)n−rn =
"µ
ˆ pi
1 − ˆ pi
¶1−2rn/n#n
,
w h i c hc o n v e r g e st o0o r∞ depending on limn→∞rn/n is greater than 1/2 or less than 1/2.I f
limn→∞rn (s)/n > 1/2, then by (2), limn→∞φ
1
n (s) = limn→∞ φ
2
n (s)=1 ,a n di fl i m n→∞rn (s)/n < 1/2,
then limn→∞φ
1
n (s)=l i m n→∞ φ
2
n (s)=0 . Since limn→∞rn (s)/n =1 /2 occurs with probability zero,
this shows the second part. The ﬁrst part follows from the fact that, according to each i, conditional
on θ = A,l i m n→∞rn (s)/n =ˆ pi > 1/2.
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 1.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m6 .
(Part1) This part immediately follows from Lemma 3, as each πi
k0fAk0 (ρ(s)) is positive, and
πi
kfAk (ρ(s)) is ﬁnite.
(Part 2) Assume F1
θ = F2
θ for each θ ∈ Θ. Then, by Lemma 3, φ
1
k,∞ (ρ) − φ
2
k,∞(ρ)=0if and
only if
¡
Tk
¡
π1¢
− Tk
¡
π2¢¢0 Tk
³¡
f1
θ(ρ)
¢
θ∈Θ
´
=0 . The latter inequality has probability 0 under both
probability measures Pr
1 and Pr
2 by hypothesis.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m7 . Deﬁne ¯ π =( 1 /K,...,1/K).F i r s t ,t a k eπ1 = π2 =¯ π. Then,
P
k06=k π1
k0f1
Ak0 (ρ(s))
π1
kf1
Ak (ρ(s))
−
P
k06=k π2
k0f1
Ak0 (ρ(s))
π2
kf1
Ak (ρ(s))
= 10
³
Tk
³¡
f1
θ (ρ(s))
¢
θ∈Θ
´
− Tk
³¡
f2
θ (ρ(s))
¢
θ∈Θ
´´
6=0 ,
where 1 ≡ (1,...,1)
0, and the inequality follows by the hypothesis of the theorem. Hence, by Lemma 3, ¯ ¯φ
1
k,∞ (ρ(s)) − φ
2
k,∞ (ρ(s))
¯ ¯ > 0 for each ρ(s) ∈ [0,1].S i n c e[0,1] is compact and
¯ ¯φ
1
k,∞ (ρ(s)) − φ
2
k,∞ (ρ(s))
¯ ¯
is continuous in ρ(s),t h e r ee x i s t s >0 such that
¯ ¯φ
1
k,∞ (ρ(s)) − φ
2
k,∞ (ρ(s))
¯ ¯ > for each ρ(s) ∈ [0,1].
Now, since
¯ ¯φ
1
k,∞ (ρ(s)) − φ
2
k,∞ (ρ(s))
¯ ¯ is continuous in π1 and π2, there exists a neighborhood N (¯ π)
of ¯ π such that
¯ ¯φ
1
k,∞ (ρ(s)) − φ
2
k,∞ (ρ(s))
¯ ¯ >
¯ ¯π1
k − π2
k
¯ ¯ for each k =1 ,...,K and s ∈ ¯ S
for all π1,π 2 ∈ N (¯ π).S i n c ePr
i ¡¯ S
¢
=1 , the last statement in the theorem follows.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m8 . Our proof utilizes the following two lemmas.
Lemma A:
lim
m→∞φ
i
k,∞,m (p)=
1
1+
P
k06=k
πi
k0
πi
k
˜ R(p − ˆ p(i,Ak0),p− ˆ p(i,Ak))
.
Proof: By condition (i), limm→∞ c
¡
i,Ak,m
¢
=1for each i and k. Hence, for every distinct k and
k0,
lim
m→∞
fi
Ak0 (p)
fi
Ak (p)
=l i m
m→∞
c
³
i,Ak0
,m
´
c(i,Ak,m)
lim
m→∞
f
³
m
³
p − ˆ p
³
i,Ak0´´´
f (m(p − ˆ p(i,Ak)))
= ˜ R
³
p − ˆ p
³
i,Ak0´
,p− ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢´
.
Then, Lemma A follows from Lemma 3. ¥
42Lemma B: For any ˜ λ>0 and h>0,t h e r ee x i s t s˜ m such that for each m>˜ m, k ≤ K,a n de a c h
ρ(s) with
° °ρ(s) − ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢° ° <h / m ,
¯ ¯ ¯φ
i
k,∞,m (ρ(s)) − lim
m→∞φ
i
k,∞,m
¡
ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢¢¯ ¯ ¯ < ˜ λ. (25)
Proof: Since, by hypothesis, ˜ R is continuous at each
¡
ˆ p(i,θ) − ˆ p
¡
j,θ
0¢
, ˆ p(i,θ) − ˆ p(j,θ)
¢
,b y
Lemma A, there exists h0 > 0, such that
¯ ¯ ¯ lim
m→∞φ
i
k,∞,m (ρ(s)) − lim
m→∞φ
i
k,∞,m
¡
ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢¢¯ ¯ ¯ < ˜ λ/2 (26)
and by condition (iii), there exists ˜ m>h / h 0 such that
¯ ¯ ¯φ
i
k,∞,m (ρ(s)) − lim
m→∞φ
i
k,∞,m (ρ(s))
¯ ¯ ¯ < ˜ λ/2. (27)
holds uniformly in
° °ρ(s) − ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢° ° <h 0. The inequalities in (26) and (27) then imply (25). ¥
(Proof of Part 1) Since ˜ R
³
ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢
− ˆ p
³
i,Ak0´
,0
´
=0for each k0 6= k (by condition (i)), Lemma
A implies that limm→∞ φ
i
k,∞,m
¡
ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢¢
=1 . Hence, limm→∞
³
φ
i
k,∞,m
¡
ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢¢
− φ
j
k,∞,m
¡
ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢¢´
=
0 if and only if limm→∞ φ
j
k,∞,m
¡
ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢¢
=1 .S i n c ee a c hr a t i oπ
j
k0/π
j
k is positive, by Lemma A, the
latter holds if only if ˜ R
³
ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢
− ˆ p
³
j,Ak0´
, ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢
− ˆ p
¡
j,Ak¢´
=0for each k0 6= k, establishing
Part 1.
(Proof of Part 2) Fix λ>0 and δ>0. Fix also any i and k.S i n c e e a c h π
j
k0/π
j
k is ﬁnite, by
Lemma 3, there exists λ
0 > 0,s u c ht h a tφ
i
k,∞,m (ρ(s)) > 1 − λ whenever fi
Ak0 (ρ(s))/fi
Ak (ρ(s)) <λ
0
holds for every k0 6= k. Now, by (i), there exists h0,k > 0, such that
Pr
i ¡° °ρ(s) − ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢° ° ≤ h0,k/m|θ = Ak¢
=
Z
kxk≤h0,k
f (x)dx > (1 − δ).
Let
Qk,m =
©
p ∈ ∆(L):
° °p − ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢° ° ≤ h0,k/m
ª
and κ ≡ minkxk≤h0,k f (x) > 0. By (i), there exists h1,k > 0 such that, whenever kxk >h 1,k, f (x) <
λ
0κ/2.T h e r e e x i s t s a s u ﬃciently large constant m1,k such that for any m>m 1,k, ρ(s) ∈ Qk,m,a n d
any k0 6= k,w eh a v e
° ° °ρ(s) − ˆ p
³
i,Ak0´° ° ° >h 1,k/m,a n d
f
³
m
³
ρ(s) − ˆ p
³
i,Ak0´´´
f (m(ρ(s) − ˆ p(i,Ak)))
<
λ
0κ
2
1
κ
=
λ
0
2
.
Moreover, since limm→∞ c(i,θ,m)=1for each i and θ,t h e r ee x i s t sm2,k >m 1,k such that
c
³
i,Ak0
,m
´
/c
¡
i,Ak,m
¢
< 2 for every k0 6= k and m>m 2,k. This implies
fi
Ak0 (ρ(s))/fi
Ak (ρ(s)) <λ
0,
establishing that
φ
i
k,∞,m (ρ(s)) > 1 − λ. (28)
Now, for j 6= i, assume that ˜ R
¡
ˆ p(i,θ) − ˆ p
¡
j,θ
0¢
, ˆ p(i,θ) − ˆ p(j,θ)
¢
=0for each distinct θ and θ
0.
Then, by Lemma A, limm→∞ φ
j
k,∞,m
¡
ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢¢
=1 , and hence by Lemma B, there exists m3,k >m 2,k
such that for each m>m 3,k, ρ(s) ∈ Qk,m,
φ
j
k,∞,m (ρ(s)) > 1 − λ. (29)
43Notice that when (28) and (29) hold, we have
° °φ
1
∞,m (s) − φ
2
∞,m (s)
° ° <λ . Then, setting ¯ m =
maxk m4,k, we obtain the desired inequality for each m>¯ m:
Pr
i ¡° °φ
1
∞,m (s) − φ
2
∞,m (s)
° ° <λ
¢
=
X
k≤K
Pr
i ¡° °φ
1
∞,m (s) − φ
2
∞,m (s)
° ° <λ |θ = Ak¢
Pr
i ¡
θ = Ak¢
≥
X
k≤K
Pr
i ¡
ρ(s) ∈ Qk,m|θ = Ak¢
Pr
i ¡
θ = Ak¢
≥
X
k≤K
(1 − δ)πi
k
=1 − δ.
(Proof of Part 3) Assume that ˜ R
¡
ˆ p(i,θ) − ˆ p
¡
j,θ
0¢
, ˆ p(i,θ) − ˆ p(j,θ)
¢
6=0for each distinct θ and
θ
0. Then, since each π
j
k0/π
j
k is positive, Lemma A implies that limm→∞ φ
j
k,∞,m
¡
ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢¢
< 1 for each
k.L e t
λ =m i n
k
n
1 − lim
m→∞φ
j
k,∞,m
¡
ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢¢o
/3 > 0.
Then, by part 2, for each k,t h e r ee x i s t sm2,k such that for every m>m 2,k and ρ(s) ∈ Qk,m,w eh a v e
φ
i
k,∞ (ρ(s)) > 1 − λ. By Lemma B, there also exists m5,k >m 2,k such that for every m>m 5,k and
ρ(s) ∈ Qk,m,
φ
j
k,∞,m (ρ(s)) < lim
m→∞φ
j
k,∞,m
¡
ˆ p
¡
i,Ak¢¢
+ λ ≤ 1 − 2λ<φ
i
k,∞ (ρ(s)) − λ.
This implies that
° °φ
1
∞,m (ρ(s)) − φ
2
∞,m (ρ(s))
° ° >λ .S e t t i n g¯ m =m a x k m5,k and changing ° °φ
1
∞,m (s) − φ
2
∞,m (s)
° ° <λat the end of the proof of Part 2 to
° °φ
1
∞,m (s) − φ
2
∞,m (s)
° ° >λ ,w eo b t a i n
the desired inequality.
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